Reading Between the Lines:  Why a Qualified  Clean Hands  Exception Should Preclude Suppression of Wiretap Evidence Under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 by Olsen, Shaun T.
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 36 
Number 3 Summer 2002 pp.719-765 
Summer 2002 
Reading Between the Lines: Why a Qualified "Clean Hands" 
Exception Should Preclude Suppression of Wiretap Evidence 
Under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
of 1968 
Shaun T. Olsen 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Shaun T. Olsen, Reading Between the Lines: Why a Qualified "Clean Hands" Exception Should Preclude 
Suppression of Wiretap Evidence Under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968, 36 Val. U. L. Rev. 719 (2002). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol36/iss3/6 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University 
Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a 
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 
READING BETWEEN THE LINES: WHY A
QUALIFIED "CLEAN HANDS" EXCEPTION
SHOULD PRECLUDE SUPPRESSION OF
WIRETAP EVIDENCE UNDER TITLE III OF THE
OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE
STREETS ACT OF 1968
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increase in the use of electronic communication
technologies, law enforcement officials have become increasingly reliant
on the use of electronic surveillance techniques to aid the government in
the detection and combat of terrorism and other forms of organized
crime, as well as criminal prosecutions in general.' At the same time,
given the potential for their misuse and the broad intrusion into an
individual's privacy, significant concerns over the use of electronic
surveillance methods have arisen.2 These concerns are based on the
I See S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 72 (1968), reprinted in 1968 US.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2159-61; see also
WHIrFIELD DiFFm & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE POLITICS OF WIRETAPPING
AND ENCRYPTION 153 (MIT Press 1998) (noting that Ie]lectronic surveillance is a tool that
can detect criminal conspiracies and provide prosecutors with strong evidence - the
conspirators' incriminating statements in their own voices - all without danger to law
enforcement officials"); CRAIG R. DUCAT, CONSTITUIONAL INTERPRETATION: RIGHTS OF THE
INDIVIDUAL 815 (6th ed. 1996) (discussing the mix of the development of technology and
systemic frustration with other methods of information gathering techniques leading to the
development of the wiretap as a new tool for the enforcement of laws); William P. Rogers,
The Case for Wiretapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792 (1954), reprinted in MONRAD G. PAULSEN, A.L.I.,
THE PROBLEMS OF ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING 16 (1977) (stating that "[w]iretapping by law
enforcement officials is a necessary concomitant of our present day pursuit of spies,
saboteurs, and other subversives [and] is no worse... than the use of informants, decoys,
dictaphones, peeping, and the like - all of which have been accepted practices for many
years").
2 See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 1, at 153. Commenting on dangers associated with the
use of wiretapping techniques to obtain information, Diffie and Landau note "the very
invisibility on which electronic surveillance depends for its effectiveness makes it evasive
of oversight and readily adaptable to malign uses." Id. "Electronic surveillance can be and
has been used by those in power to undermine the democratic process by spying on their
political opponents." Id.; see also L Schwartz, On Current Proposals to legalize Wiretapping,
103 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1954), reprinted in PAULSEN, supra note 1, at 11-12. In commenting on
the chilling effect that wiretapping techniques can have for human, commercial, and
political interaction, Schwartz notes:
Free conversation is often characterized by exaggeration, obscenity,
agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of antisocial desires or views
not intended to be taken seriously. The unedited equality of
conversation is essential if it is to preserve its intimate, personal and
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emergence, development, and expansive use of an extensive landline
telecommunications infrastructure, and more recently, the wireless
telecommunications infrastructure within the United States.3 Starting in
the early 1900s and extending through the 1960s, the United States
Supreme Court struggled to define the proper use of electronic
surveillance techniques by law enforcement officials, particularly
wiretapping techniques.4 The Court concluded that the use of wiretaps
implicated individuals' privacy interests to such a degree that the Fourth
Amendment required law enforcement officials to obtain warrants in
order to use information gathered from wiretaps as evidence in
prosecutions.
5
informal character. How anxious people are to preserve this unedited
aspect of telephone conversations can be seen from the public reaction
against the recording of telephone conversations even by one of the
parties to the call .... The objection, of course, is even more serious
when it becomes a matter of having one's telephone conversations
recorded by police agents. Government officials and business and
political leaders are beginning to hesitate to employ the telephone, so
that we may be reaching a stage where the telephone's usefulness as
an instrument of commerce and government is being impaired,
without demonstrable gains in law enforcement.
Schwartz, supra, at 11-1Z
3 See Dium & LANDAU, supra note 1, at I (discussing some of the ways telecommunications
have been established as an intrinsic element of modem society). In their observations on
the pervasive and catalytic effect of telephonic communications on society, Diffie and
Landau note:
[We now conduct more and more of our communications, whether
personal, business, or civic, via electronic channels. The availability of
telecommunication has transformed government, giving
administrators real-time access to their employees and representatives
in remote parts of the world. It has transformed commerce, facilitating
worldwide enterprises and beginning the internationalization of
business that is the byword of the present decade. It has transformed
warfare, giving generals the ability to operate from the safety of rear
areas and admirals the capacity to control fleets scattered across
oceans. It has transformed personal relationships, allowing friends
and family to converse daily even though the live thousands of miles
apart .... To attempt to function in modern society without employing
telecommunication is to be eccentric.
Id.
4 See Katz v. United States, 389 US. 347,352 (1967). Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart
noted the expansive role "the public telephone has come to play in private
communication." Id.
5 Id. Justice Stewart, in writing the opinion of the Court, indicated that when individuals
take the necessary steps to assure the privacy of their telephone conversation, they may
"rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment." Id. Justice Stewart continued and
stated that a person placing a call "is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into
the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world." Id. "To read the Constitution more
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In this context, Congress enacted Title ITI as a part of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Act).' In promulgating Title
III, Congress attempted to provide law enforcement officials with the
necessary electronic surveillance tools to detect and prosecute "serious"
crimes while balancing society's interest in protecting the privacy of
telephonic communications. At the core of this balancing of interests in
Title III is Section 2515.8 Section 2515 operates to suppress any evidence
directly or indirectly derived from actions violating the Act.9 In addition
to Section 2515, Title III also provides for civil and criminal penalties for
those who violate its strictures.10
On its face, Section 2515 appears to require the suppression of any
evidence gathered in a manner that violates Title I." However, the
suppression of all offending wiretap derived evidence is not clearly
narrowly is to ignore the vital role" that telephone occupies in an individual's ability to
communicate with others. Id.
6 See generally Stephen L Sapp, Private Interceptions of re and Oral Communications Under
Title III: Rethinking Congressional Intent, 16 AM. J. CRIM. L 181,184 (1989). The final product
of Title IIl was drafted in light of the history of wiretapping and to comply with Supreme
Court decisions. Id.
7 Sapp, supra note 6, at 185. Specifically, Congress intended to provide national standards
and directions to law enforcement officials. Id. at 184. Additionally, Congress sought to
protect personal privacy by prohibiting all unauthorized wiretaps by both government and
private parties. Id. at 185. However, Congress limited the protection of privacy by
permitting the use of wiretaps to combat organized and otherwise serious crime. Id.
8 Fleming v. United States, 547 F.2d 872, 873 (5th Cir. 1977); see also United States v.
Wuliger, 981 F.2d 1497,1506 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting Congress' view that Section 2515 largely
reflects current exclusionary rule jurisprudence and is not intended to extend further than
that body of law); United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 855 (3d Cir. 1978) (stating that
Section 2515 is Title III's statutory exclusionary rule).
918 U.S.C. § 2515 (1994). The statutory exclusionary rule of Title III is found in 18 U.S.C. §
2515, which provides:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no
part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived
therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other
proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer,
agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of
the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof if the
disclosure of the information would be in violation of this chapter.
18 U.S.C. §2515.
10 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a) (1994) (allowing a criminal penalty of up to five years
imprisonment and a fine); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(5)(a)(ii)(B) (1994) (allowing a private individual
to petition the courts for an injunction against the violator, along with a mandatory $500
civil fine, and a $500 civil fine for each violation of any injunctive order).
11 See infra Part IV.A-B; see also supm note 9 and accompanying text (quoting the full text of
Section 2515).
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commanded by the plain language of Section 2515.12 Instead, the plain
language of Section 2515 appears to make suppression a discretionary
act of the judiciary. 13 Consequently, difficulties arise in attempting to
apply Section 2515's exclusionary rule to law enforcement officials using
wiretap evidence obtained with "clean hands" because such evidence
was procured by a private actor's wiretap.'4 To date, many courts facing
related issues have found that it is appropriate to preclude suppression
under Section 2515 based on the "good faith" exception, the alter ego of
the clean hands doctrine.15
Additionally, the legislative history of the Section 2515 exclusionary
rule declares that the suppression of evidence is to be consistent with the
application of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule.'6 Under the
Fourth Amendment, evidence uncovered by a private search is never
subject to suppression because the Fourth Amendment limits state, not
private, action.' 7 Therefore, in situations where a clean hands exception
may apply, namely when law enforcement officials receive information
from private illegal wiretaps, the text of Section 2515 and Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence conflict. 8 While Section 2515 may require
suppression, the Fourth Amendment poses absolutely no barrier to the
admission of such wiretap evidence at trial.' 9 As such, if the intent
behind Title III was to make Section 2515 applicable only when the
Fourth Amendment requires suppression, applying Section 2515 to
suppress wiretap evidence where the Fourth Amendment would not
12 See infra Part W.A.1; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text (quoting the full text of
Section 2515).
13 See infra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing the distinctions in word choice that
indicate legislative commands, such as in the use of the word "shall," mandating certain
action, as opposed to the word "may," allowing discretion).
14 See S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 96 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112. 2184-85.
Specifically, Congress indicated that the exclusionary rule in Section 2515 was not intended
"to press the scope of the suppression role beyond present search and seizure law." Id.
Is See infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text (noting a number of cases that have refused
to apply the Section 2515 exclusionary rule where law enforcement officials obtained
information via illegal wiretaps pursuant to a good faith analysis).
16 See S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), at 96, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112. 2184-85.
Congress declared that the Section 2515 exclusionary rule "largely reflected" the
jurisprudence regarding the suppression of evidence under the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary rule. Id.
1
7 See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of the Fourth
Amendment and its applicability to state action but not to action taken by private
individuals).
1" See infra Part IV.A.Z
1" See infra Part V.C.1.
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creates an absurd and contrary result to that intended by Congress.20 In
such cases, the judiciary should adhere to the legislative intent instead of
the plain language.2'
In light of these obscurities, courts have experienced difficulty in
interpreting and applying Title M when prosecutors attempt to
introduce information gathered from private wiretaps that law
enforcement officials receive with clean hands.2 Reflecting the difficulty
in resolving this issue, decisions over the past three decades lack
uniformity. 23  For instance, compare the following decisions: a Fifth
Circuit decision held that clean hands should automatically preclude
Section 2515 suppression;2 whereas a First Circuit decision indicated
that a clean hands exception to Section 2515 may be appropriate given
the circumstances of the case;2 while a Third Circuit decision declared
that clean hands should never prevent suppression under Section 2515.26
- See infra Part IV.A2
21 See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text (ignoring the plain language of a statute
where the results of the plain language would create a result absurd or contrary to
legislative intent).
22 See infra notes 24-26 (discussing current judicial conflict).
23 See, e.g., Gelbard v. United States, 408 US. 41, 47 (1972) (holding that grand jury
witnesses are entitled to invoke Title IlI's suppression provision to defend against contempt
charges brought for refusing to testify); Berry v. Funk 146 F.3d 1003,1012 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(rejecting both a broad "clean hands" exception and a use and disclosure exception to
Section 2515); Chandler v. United States Army, 125 F3d 1296,1302 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
that police may use and disclose contents of illegally intercepted communications when
innocently received); In re Grand Jury, 111 F.3d 1066, 1077 (3d Cir. 1997) (rejecting an
"unarticulated" clean hands exception to Section 2515's exclusionary rule); United States v.
Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391, 1404 (6th Cir. 1995) (refusing to suppress illegally intercepted
communication under Section 2515 because government officials were innocent recipients
of the wiretap evidence); Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1545 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that
police may use and disclose internally the contents of illegally intercepted communications
when innocently received); United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477, 484 (1st Cir. 1987)
(suppressing illegally intercepted communication under Section 2515 despite the innocence
of government officials in a peijury prosecution); United States v. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105,
112 (6th Cir. 1987) (refusing to suppress illegally intercepted evidence when movant was
perpetrator of illegal wiretap interception); United States v. Caron, 474 F.2d 506,509-10 (5th
Cir. 1973) (allowing prosecution to use illegally intercepted information for impeachment
purposes).
24 See Murdock, 63 F3d at 1404 (refusing to suppress illegally intercepted communication
under Section 2515 because government was innocent recipient).
25 See Vest, 813 F.2d at 484 (suppressing illegally intercepted communication under Section
2515 despite the fact that the government was the innocent recipient of evidence in perjury
prosecution).
26 See In re Grand Jury, 111 F3d at 1077 (rejecting an "unarticulated" clean hands exception
to Section 2515's exclusionary rule).
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This Note discusses whether evidence procured in violation of Title
m, but obtained with clean hands by the government, should be
admitted at trial. Specifically, this Note asserts that a qualified clean
hands exception is appropriate when law enforcement officials receive
evidence from an illegal private wiretap with clean hands and that
information is used to prosecute serious crimes enumerated within Title
III. First, Part II examines the conceptual and legal history leading to the
enactment of Title r. 27 Second, Part I explores the enactment of Title
III, judicial exceptions to the implementation of Section 2515, and the
conflicting circuit decisions. 2s Third, Part IV discusses why a qualified
clean hands exception is appropriate given the text of Section 2515, its
legislative history, and the congressional balancing of privacy and crime
control interests.2 Finally, Part V concludes that the judiciary should
adopt a model qualified clean hands exception that precludes
suppression of evidence from private illegal wiretaps if received by law
enforcement officials with clean hands and used in the prosecution of the
serious crimes enumerated in Title M1.30
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND LEADING TO THE ENACTMENT OF
THE FEDERAL WIRETAP ACT
A. The Fourth Amendment: The Background Infrastructure Regarding the
Admissibility of Evidence in Criminal Proceedings
The historical impetus of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution reflected a recognition that abuses associated with
searches and seizures, such as those conducted by English officials, were
a fundamental source of conflict between the public and government
3
'
2 See infra Part If.
n See infra Part ill.
See infra Part rv.
30 See infra Part V.
31 See US. CONSr. amend IV. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.; see, e.g., Navigation Act of 1662, 13 & 14 Car.II, c.11, § 5 (Eng.) (directing customs
officials to: "[G]o into any House, Shop, Cellar, Warehouse or Room... and in case of
resistance, to break open Doors, Chests, Trunks, and other Packages, there to seize and
from thence to bring any Kind of Goods or Merchandise whatsoever, prohibited and
uncustomed"); see also Omar Saleem, TheL Age of Unreason: The Impact of Reasonableness,
Increased Police Force, and Colorblindness on Terry "Stop and Frisk" 50 OKLA. L REV. 451, 453-
54 (1997). The abuse by English governmental officials of search and seizure powers and
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 3 [2002], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol36/iss3/6
2002] WIRETAP CLEAN HANDS EXCEPTION 725
Consequently, the Fourth Amendment was ratified to protect the public
against arbitrary and capricious intrusions by the government.
32
In an effort to give practical effect to the Fourth Amendment's
proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures, the Supreme Court
developed the "exclusionary rule."33  The exclusionary rule, as
established in Weeks v. United States,34 operates by suppressing evidence
obtained by law enforcement officials in a manner violative of the Fourth
Amendment.35  The Court adopted the exclusionary rule because it
the resultant resentment contributed to the movement towards the American Revolution.
Saleem, supra, at 453-54.
32See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). The
detrimental impact of arbitrary and capricious governmental searches and seizures was
described by Justice Jackson in an opinion written 138 years after the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment
[The rights of the Fourth Amendment are not] mere second class rights
but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among
deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population,
crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart.
Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective
weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government And one need
only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a people possessed of
many admirable qualities but deprived of these rights to know that the
human personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear
where homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour to
unheralded search and seizure by the police.
Id.
33 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 50 (1967). As the Amendment did not articulate or
allude to a remedy for its violation, the Supreme Court had, in Weeks, pronounced the
exclusionary rule for its violations. Id. Justice Clark in commenting on the Weeks decision
indicated:
The effect of the 4th Amendment is to put the courts of the United
States... under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such
power ... and to forever secure the people ... against all unreasonable
searches and seizures under the guise of law. This protection reaches
all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving force
and effect is obligatory on all .... The tendency of those who execute
the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of
unlawful seizures.. . should find no sanction in the judgments of the
courts, which are charged at all times with the support of the
Constitution, and to which people of all conditions have a right to
appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.
Id. (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,391-92 (1914)).
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
3 See Berger, 388 U.S. at 50.
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considered the rule the most efficient method of deterring law
enforcement misconduct in the future.
36
The exclusionary rule inherently operates to deter misconduct of law
enforcement by denying prosecutors the use of improperly gathered
information at trial.3' A significant limitation to the exclusionary rule,
first announced in Weeks, is that the rule's application is restricted solely
to state actors.38 To legally execute a search or seizure, law enforcement
officials must ordinarily obtain advance judicial approval in the form of
a warrant supported by probable cause.39 Failure to seek a warrant is
excused only in special circumstances.40 Since the Fourth Amendment is
36 See Weeks, 232 US. at 393. The Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule was made
applicable to the states by the Supreme Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961). Id.; see also United States v. Leon, 468 US. 897,922 (1984) (holding that suppression
of evidence under the exclusionary rule is inappropriate in situations where law
enforcement officials have an objectively-reasonable good faith belief that there is no
violation of the Fourth Amendment because there is no improper activity to deter).
37 See Sharon L Davies, The Penalty of Exclusion - A Price or Sanction?, 73 S. CAL L REV.
1275, 1275-76 (2000); see also Mapp, 367 US. at 656 (stating that the exclusionary rule
operates to promote police compliance with the Fourth Amendment's "constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way - by removing the incentive to disregard it")
(quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
3 See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465,476 (1921) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
is focused solely on state action and therefore the exclusionary rule is not applicable to
suppress the fruits of private searches); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109
(1984). The Supreme Court reiterated the private search distinction of the Fourth
Amendment in stating that the Fourth Amendment "is wholly inapplicable to a search or
seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent
of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental official"
Jacobsen, 367 US. at 113 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
3See Johnson v. United States, 333 US. 10, 14 (1977). The United States Supreme Court
indicated that search warrants are preferred because they require a detached and neutral
magistrate to make probable cause determinations, which provides more safeguards
against Fourth Amendment violations than if the determinations were solely left to law
enforcement officials. Id.; accord United States v. Chadwick 433 US. 1, 9 (1977). The Court
indicated that it held a "strong preference for warrants." Leon, 468 US. at 914 (1984)
(quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 US. 10Z 106 (1965)); see also DUCAT & LANDAU,
supra note 1, at 745 (noting that "[ilt is clear that the general rule with regard to the conduct
of searches and seizures is that they are to be executed pursuant to a warrant...").
40 See William W. Greenhalgh & Mark J. Yost, In Defense of the 'Per Se" Rule: Justice Stewart's
Struggle to Preserve the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013, 1017-
18 (1994); see also Michigan v. Tyler, 436 US. 499 (1978) (recognizing exigent circumstances
of a burning building); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 US. 218 (1973) (allowing a search
based on consent); Terry v. Ohio, 392 US. 1 (1968) (recognizing the propriety in allowing a
stop and frisk for weapons); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1967)
(permitting regulatory inspection of premises); Warden v. Hayden, 387 US. 294 (1967)
(recognizing exigent circumstances of hot pursuit and immediate emergency); Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) (allowing search incident to a lawful arrest); United States v.
Newell, 506 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1973) (permitting border searches for contraband and illegal
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directed solely against state action and not the activities of private
individuals, private searches are completely unfettered by the Fourth
Amendment 41 However, because the development of electronic
communications techniques presented a new forum for human
interaction not contemplated when the Fourth Amendment was ratified,
new challenges to the judiciary developed because it was not
immediately clear whether wiretaps violated the Fourth AmendmenL42
B. Attempting to Splice the Cables of the Fourth Amendment and Wiretapping
for Law Enforcement Purposes
With the advent of the telephone, as with the development of many
other types of communications technology, new opportunities arose for
criminals to conduct their nefarious deeds while enhancing the efficiency
of their enterprises. 43 However, the development of technology assets
also provided additional opportunities for law enforcement officials to
detect, track, and prosecute criminal conduct." In Olmstead v. United
aliens); United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973) (allowing airport searches for
weapons and explosives); Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230 (6th Cir. 1972) (permitting
searches of briefcases and purses upon entering a federal courthouse).
41 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SEARCi & SEIZURE § 1.8 (3d ed. 1996); see also United States v.
Livesay, 983 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1993) (allowing admission of evidence discovered when an
airline company employee opened a freight shipment); United States v. Mithun, 933 F.2d
631 (8th Cir. 1991) (admitting evidence gathered by hotel employees who searched a car
parked on a hotel ramp); United States v. Ramirez, 810 F2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1987) (admitting
evidence from a landlord's search of tenans possessions); United States v. Walsh, 791 F.2d
811 (10th Cir. 1986) (allowing search by an airline employee of an unclaimed bag); United
States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1982) (permitting evidence gathered by victim
searching for property taken from him); United States v. Jackson, 578 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir.
1978) (admitting defendant's business records taken by his ex-spouse and given to the IRS);
United States v. Manning, 542 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1976) (finding a private search when a
telephone company monitored calls to discover theft of services); State v. Christensen, 797
P.2d 893 (Mont 1990) (admitting evidence police received for a burglar who discovered
evidence of his victim's criminality); cf. United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 1994)
(finding the physical act of searching by a private person still governmental action if
instigated by or in conjunction with the authorities); State v. Hunt, 280 S.W.2d 37 (Mo.
1955) (declaring a police search not a private search by the mere fact that a private person is
a bystander in a position to see what the police have uncovered); People v. Adams, 422
N.E.2d 537 (N.Y. 1981) (stating a search by a police officer at the request of a private person
is governmental action).42 See infra Part I.B. (discussing the development of the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
relating to the constitutional implications of-wiretaps).
43 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 46 (1967) (noting examples of cases where
newspapers 'raided' each others' communications to save time and money, and where
bettors intercepted news of racing events before the official results arrived).
44 See id. Justice Brandeis argued that the majority's decision in Olmstead, 277 US. 438, 474
(1928), was particularly shocking because newer techniques of surveillance would defeat
the simplistic distinction that a search can only occur within the home. Id.; see also 114
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States,4' the United States Supreme Court declined to extend the
protections of the Fourth Amendment to telephonic communications.46
In writing the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Taft rigidly construed
the Fourth Amendment to require a trespassory intrusion by
government agents into the defendant's home or office.47 Hence, since
there was no trespassory intrusion, Taft reasoned that there was no
"search" to trigger the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule.48
However, this reasoning formed a basis for a conflict among the Justices
regarding the true purpose of the Fburth Amendment 49  Justice
Brandeis' dissent contended that a physical, trespassory search is not
necessary to substantiate a Fourth Amendment violation that can instead
occur whenever one's privacy is intruded upon unreasonably.50 In
writing its opinion, the Olmstead majority indicated that Congress had
the capacity via direct legislation to protect the secrecy of telephonic
communications.5'
CONG. REC. 14,480 (1968). Sen. Long of Missouri commented that there are significant
concerns over the privacy interests of the general public and that many more law-abiding
citizens use electronic communications methods than criminals. 114 CONG. R. 14,480
(1968).
4' 277 US. 438 (1928).
46 Id. at 465.
47 ld. at 466. Chief Justice Taft declared:
Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many federal decisions
brought to our attention hold the Fourth Amendment to have been
violated as against a defendant unless there has been an official search
and seizure of his person or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible
material effects or an actual physical invasion of his house 'or curtilage'
for the purpose of making a seizure. We think, therefore, that the wire
tapping here disclosed did not amount to a search or seizure within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
Id.
48 Id. at 465 (holding that "[tJhe intervening wires are not part of his house or office
anymore than are the highways along which they are stretched).
49 Id. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis argued that privacy, defined as
"the right to be left alone," was, by itself, a right Id. at 478. As such, the distinction
between a search occurring within a physical location or via telephone lines was
"immaterial." Id. at 479.
50 See Michael S. Leib, E-Mail and the Wiretap Laws: Why Congress Should Add Electronic
Cormunication to Title ll's Statutory Exclusionary Rule and Expressly Reject a "Good Faith"
Exception, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393,399 (1997); see also Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474.
51 Olmstead v. United States, 277 US. 438, 465-66 (1928) (stating that "Congress may, of
course, protect the secrecy of telephone messages by making them, when intercepted,
inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal trials, by direct legislation, and thus depart
from the common law of evidence").
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Six years later, in response to the Courfs invitation in Olmstead,
Congress enacted the Federal Communications Act of 1934 (FCA).52 The
FCA was an effort by Congress to placate fears that government officials
could freely intercept telephonic and other electronic communications by
prohibiting the use of a wiretap under any circumstance. 53  An
immediate concern regarding the FCA was that it barred all law
enforcement officials from using wiretaps or any other form of electronic
surveillance, even when attempting to investigate and prosecute the
most serious of felonies.54 However, while the FCA proscribed gathering
information via wiretaps, Congress failed to include an exclusionary rule
to suppress wiretap evidence when prosecutors attempted to enter such
evidence in judicial proceedings. 55 Additionally, Congress passed the
FCA with very little legislative history, making the judiciary's task of
applying the FCA even more difficult.5
6
Due to the FCA's lack of an internal statutory exclusionary rule in
the event of a violation, the confusion created in the federal and state
courts by the FCA led to a myriad of inconsistent decisions." Due to the
52 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1982) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 705 (1994)). The pertinent part of the
FCA declared that "[No] person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any
communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect,
or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person." 47 U.S.C. § 605 (current
version at 47 U.S.C. § 705).
See JAMES G. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECrRONic SURVIL.ANCE § 1.3(b) (2d ed. 1986). Carr
indicated that the FCA was passed in response to Olnstead as an attempt to outlaw
wiretapping. Id.
54 See Francis Marion Hamilton, Ill, Note, Should 'Clean Hands' Protect the Government
Against Section 2515 Suppression Under Title Ill of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968?, 53 WASH & LEE L REV. 1473,1476 (1996).
See CARR, supra note 53, at § 27 n.7.
See CARR, supru note 53, at § 1.3(b).
5 The confusion created in the federal courts was slight and quickly remedied by the
Supreme Court. See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 382 (1937) (holding that while
the FCA contained no exclusionary rule, suppression of the information gathered in
violation of the Act was the only method available to give effect to the statute).
Additionally, on rehearing, when the defendant was retried without the direct wiretap
evidence but allowing evidence derived from that wiretap, the Court held that the
exclusionary rule applied not only to evidence directly but also indirectly gathered from a
violation of the Act. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). The Court has also
held that evidence procured from a wiretap warrant pursuant to a state statute was
inadmissible in a federal prosecution. Benati v. United States, 355 U.S. 96,100 (1957). The
confusion created in state judicial proceedings was much more profound. Originally, the
Supreme Court held that all evidence obtained by state law enforcement agents from a
wiretap was admissible in state court proceedings despite the FCA. Schwartz v. Texas, 344
U.S. 199, 201-02 (1952). Later, after the Court's decision in Benati put the future of Schwartz
in question, the Second Circuit perpetuated the confusion in Schwartz by allowing wiretap
evidence gathered via a state wiretap warrant to be admitted in a state court proceeding.
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lack of any substantial legislative history, three other situations
commonly arose that further limited the applicability of the FCA.58 The
first exception to the FCA was that it did not bar the admission of
evidence gathered from a telephone conversation when one of the
parties consented to a law enforcement official overhearing the
conversation.59 A second common exception to the FCA arose when
telephone companies acted pursuant to their interests, such as billing
and systems maintenance, and law enforcement agents sought the
records generated from such activities.6° The third general exception to
the FCA was the federal government's ability to conduct wiretaps in the
interest of national security.6'
The lack of a statutory exclusionary rule and the FCA's inherent
limitations meant that its proscriptions against the government were
applied on a narrow basis.62 Furthermore, contrary to the Court's intent
to remedy the situation, the application of an exclusionary rule by the
See Pugach v. Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739, 743-44 (2d Or. 1961). It was not until 1968 that the
Court held that a violation of the FCA applied both to state actors and private citizens, and
that evidence acquired from a wiretap was inadmissible in any court proceeding. See Lee
v. Florida, 392 US. 378,386 (1968).
58 See CARR, supra note 53, at §§ 1.3(b)(3), 13(b)(3)(b)(c); see also infra notes 59-61 and
accompanying text.
N Rathburn v. United States, 355 US. 107 (1957). Based on the consenting to surveillance
principal, the Court held that various methods used by law enforcement officials to obtain
the information were valid. Id.; see also United States v. Cooper, 365 F.2d 246, 250 (6th Cir.
1966) (allowing the use of a suction cup microphone to overhear a telephone conversation);
Ferguson v. United States, 307 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Or. 1962), withdrawn on other grounds, per
curiam, 329 F.2d 923 (10th Or. 1964) (allowing the use of a specially installed extension line
to overhear telephone conversations); State v. Carbone, 183 A.2d 1, 5 (N.J. 1962) (allowing
law enforcement officials to use the defendant's own telephone to overhear conversations
when the connecting party consents).
6D See, e.g., United States v. Galo, 123 F.2d 229 (2d Or. 1941) (implying consent of
telephone companies' users to discover those using the telephone system to defraud the
telephone company). The users of telephones were held to have impliedly consented to
telephone companies overhearing their conversations based solely by their using the
telephone system. Id.; accord Bubis v. United States, 384 F.2d 643 (9th Or. 1969); Brandon v.
United States, 382 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1967). Requests for information gathered by the
telephone companies were generally held not to violate the FCA. See Nolan v. United
States, 423 F.2d 1031, 1045 (10th Cir. 1970) (making telephone company records subject to
grand jury subpoenas); DiPiazza v. United States, 415 F.2d 99, 102-03 (6th Or. 1969)
(allowing the IRS to summon telephone company records).
61 United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950). Initially, the federal government's
ability to conduct wiretaps in the interests of national security was found to be in violation
of the FCA. Id. However, in United States v. Butenko, the Third Circuit found that the
Coplon court failed to take into consideration national security features and held that the
FCA was not a barrier to national security related wiretapping. 494 F.2d 593 (1974).
6 2 See CARE, supra note 53, at § 1.3(b)(3).
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Supreme Court did not ultimately deter violations of the FCA by either
public or private actors.' This situation led critics to state that the FCA
was the "worst possible solution" in attempting to balance the privacy
interests of law-abiding citizens with the government's interest in
pursing criminal offenders." While Congress annually attempted to
amend the FCA to rectify some of the concerns articulated, the states also
enacted legislation to proscribe wiretapping. 5
In 1967, the Supreme Court decided two cases that effectively
reversed the Court's stance on wiretapping: Berger v. New York" and
Katz v. United States.67 Prior to these cases, the Court struggled with the
Olmstead distinction between trespassory actions that implicated the
Fourth Amendment and non-trespassory actions that did not implicate
the Fourth Amendment" In overruling Olmstead, the Katz Court
incorporated Justice Brandeis' reasoning that the Fourth Amendment
applied to people and not just to physical places, thus rejecting the
requirement of a trespassory action to 'trigger' a search under the Fourth
Amendment 9
The Court, in Katz, followed a recent line of cases discrediting the
trespassory distinction and held that Fourth Amendment protections are
63 See CARR, supra note 53, at §§ 1.3(b)(3), 2.1. Carr noted that "(pirivate citizens and public
officials could ignore the prohibition against wiretapping without fear of prosecution.
while law enforcement officials could not use [wiretaps) to investigate and prosecute even
the most serious crimes." Id. at § 2.1.
64 See CARM, supra note 53, at § 2.1. Carr cites for this proposition mainly the statement of
Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Hearings on
Criminal Laws and Procedures Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiary, 89th
Cong. 38 (1966) (statement of Atfy Gen. Nicholas Katzenbach).
65 See CAR, supra note 53, at § 2.4. Prior to Title In's enactment, 34 states had enacted laws
to outlaw any use of wiretapping. See CARM, supra note 53, at § 2.4 n.62 and accompanying
text. Twelve other states had enacted legislation regarding wiretapping. See CAR, supra
note 53, at § 2.4 n.62.1 and accompanying text.
388 US. 41 (1967).
67 389 US. 347 (1967).
68 See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1940). The Supreme Court in Goldman
indicated that it could find "no reasonable or logical distinction" between the method of
applying a listening device against a wall at issue and the non-trespassory method
involved in Olmstead. Id. Despite the Court's misgivings, it sustained this distinction in a
several cases. See Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (per curiam) (holding placement
of a device that entered premises by a thumbtack's length was held violative of the Fourth
Amendment); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (holding placement of a
"spike mike" that penetrated five-sixteenths of an inch violated Fourth Amendment);
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 131-32 (1954) (holding placement of a microphone in
defendant's bedroom violated Fourth Amendment).
69 See supra notes 44, 49 and accompanying text
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applicable to "people, not places." 70 The Court reasoned that in entering
a telephone booth and closing the door, an individual has a justifiable
expectation of privacy while using the telephone contained inside.7' In
doing so, the Court recognized the new importance of "public
telephone[s] .. in private communications" and held that the use of a
"bug" on the outside of a phone booth constituted an unreasonable
search and seizure regardless of the fact that the bug did not penetrate
into the telephone booth itself.72
With the Court's change in position, the critical question became
what constituted a reasonable search and seizure.73 Although it was
decided months before the Katz decision, the Supreme Court had
effectively answered this question in Berger.7 4 In Berger, a state statute
authorizing wiretaps required law enforcement officials to obtain
wiretap warrants from a "neutral and detached authority" embodied by
the New York judiciary." s  While the Court approved of that
70 Katz, 389 US. at 351; see also Siberman, 365 US. at 511 (holding expressly that the Fourth
Amendment is applicable in recording oral statements without any "technical trespass
under... local property law"); Warden v. Hayden, 387 US. 294, 304 (1967) (holding that
"[tihe premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and
seize has been discredited").
71 Katz, 389 US. at 351. In concurring, Justice Harlan reasoned: "i"here is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.'" Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
72 ld. at 352-53.
7 Id. at 353. In writing for the majority, Justice Stewart stated "[o]ver and again this Court
has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to
judicial processes... and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable ... subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Id. at 356.
74 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
73Id. at 54. The relevant text of the challenged court procedure are as follows:
§813-a. Ex parte order for eavesdropping.
An ex parte order for eavesdropping as defined by subdivisions one
and two of section seven hundred thirty-eight of the penal law may be
issued by any justice of the supreme court or judge of a county court or
of the court of general sessions of the county of New York upon oath
or affirmation of a district attorney, or of the attorney-general or on
officer above the rank of sergeant of any police department of the state
or any political subdivision thereof, that there is reasonable ground to
believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained, and particularly
describing the person or persons whose communications,
conversations or discussions are to be overheard or recorded and the
purpose thereof, and, in the case of a telegraphic or telephonic
communication, identifying the particular telephone number or
telegraph line involved....
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requirement, it had several reservations concerning other aspects of the
wiretap warrant procedure. 76
One concern was that the New York judiciary appeared to
automatically issue warrants upon the affidavit of "higher level" law
enforcement officials." Further, law enforcement officials merely needed
to state that there were "reasonable grounds" to believe that a wiretap
would uncover evidence of a crime to obtain a warrant.78 This troubled
the Court because it suggested the possibility that warrants might be
issued without a neutral and independent determination of probable
cause.79 Additionally, the Court held that the wiretap authorization
statute was overbroad because it contained no "precise and
discriminate" requirement as the warrant was not required to
"particularly describe the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized."so The Court expounded on this issue by indicating that in
the context of wiretaps, the intrusion on the subject's privacy was very
broad.8' Consequently, a "heavy burden" for "particularity and
evidence of reliability" must be met before the judiciary should
authorize a wiretap warrant.s2
Additionally, the Court was concerned that the New York statute
lacked limitations and safeguards that the Court required in wiretap
warrant situations. 3 Finally, the Court found the wiretap authorization
N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. Section 813-a (McKinney) (repealed), reprinted in PAULSEN, supra
note I at 48-49 n.1; see also N.Y. Penal Law Section 738 (McKinney) (repealed).76 See infra notes 77.84 and accompanying text (discussing the factors the Berger court found
deficient in the New York wiretap warrant procedure).
7 Berger, 388 U.S. at 54.
78 Id. at 54-56.
9 Id. Law enforcement officials competent to make such affidavits included the "the
attorney general, the district attorney or any police officer above the rank of sergeant" Id.
SOid. at 58.
81 Id. at 56.
821d. In expounding on the situation of electronic communications, the Court approvingly
addressed the admission of wiretap evidence in Osborn v. United States, where two judges
jointly authorized a wiretap warrant upon "a detailed factual affidavit alleging the
commission of a specific criminal offense directly and immediately affecting the
administration of justice... for the narrow and particularized purpose of ascertaining the
truth of the affidavit's allegations." Id. (quoting Osbom v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 330
(1966)); see also ANTHONY A. ALBERT WiRETAPS: A COMPLETE GUIDE FOR THE LAW AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROFESSIONAL 1 (Austin & Winfield 1999) (noting that "[t]he average
Affidavit and Application size can reach or exceed 100 pages, a product of the higher
degree criterion required for the Courts agreement to authorization and issuance").
83 Berger v. New York, 388 US. 41, 57-58 (1967); see also supra note 82 (discussing the
Court's decision and requirements in Osborn). Included among these safeguards were a
limitation on the scope of what the law enforcement officials could look for in terms of
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procedure deficient because, unlike other types of search warrants, the
procedure did not require law enforcement officials to show "exigent
circumstances."" According to the Court, exigent circumstances were
required to justify the need for a wiretap search because, to be effective,
the subject of the search would not be informed of the wiretap unlike
other types of searches." In light of the constitutional requirements to
legally engage in wiretapping as articulated by the Katz and Berger
decisions, Congress promulgated Title M of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968. 6
I. ENTERING THE SWITCHBOARD OF CONTROVERSY - THE LOSS OF CIRCUrr
COHESIVENESS
In order to properly analyze why a qualified clean hands exception
to Title Ill's statutory exclusionary rule is appropriate, it is first necessary
to examine the impetus behind the creation of Title HI, the underlying
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence it rests upon, and the cases
interpreting and applying Section 2515's exclusionary rule. Therefore,
Subpart A begins by exploring the genesis of Title I as an attempt by
Congress to respond to the problems of the FCA, as well as the changes
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence articulated by Berger and Katz.87
Second, Subpart B discusses the establishment of exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule, including the good faith
exception and its alter ego: the clean hands exception." Third, Subpart
C explores the compatibility between the application of the exclusionary
rules of the Fourth Amendment and Section 2515 of Title Il.89 Fourth,
Subpart D examines the differing federal circuit court decisions on the
criminal activity and where they could 'look' in seeling the information. Berger, 388 U.S. at
57. Another safeguard was that the warrant authorized a one-time limited intrusion as
opposed to a continuous series of intrusions. Idt Next, the Court held that the warrant
requirement that the law enforcement officials return to the court to seek additional
warrants. Id The Court also approved of the expeditious manner that the law enforcement
officials executed the warrants. Id. Finally, the Court found that "the danger of an
unlawful search and seizure" was minimized because of the requirement that law
enforcement officials return to court when finished to explain how the warrants were used
and what evidence was uncovered. Id.
- Berger, 388 US. at57.
85 Id.; see also supra note 5 and accompanying texL
,6 See S. REP. No. 90-1097 at 75 (1968), repinted in 1968 US.C.C.A.N. 2112. 2163. "Working
from the hypothesis that any wiretapping and electronic surveillance legislation should
include... constitution of standards, the subcommittee has used the Berger and Katz
decisions as a guide in drafting Title IM." Id.
- See infra Part II1.A.
*See infra Part lIl.B.
- See infra Part III.C.
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applicability of a clean hands exception in situations involving violations
of Title III.90 Finally, Subpart E looks at the extent to which the good
faith and clean hands exceptions have already permeated Title III's
exclusionary rule as embodied in Section 2515.9
A. The New Effort to Integrate the Fourth Amendment and Wiretapping for
Law Enforcement Purposes - The Passage of Title III
Title I is currently the most relevant piece of legislation on the
availability of wiretap evidence for use by the government at trial.92 It
also provides the foundation for the regulation of most other forms of
electronic surveillance techniques. 93  In addition, Title ll provides a
template for state wiretap regulations.94
Title III overcomes many of the deficiencies in the language and
application of the FCA.9 First, Title ill provides for the legal use of
wiretaps by law enforcement officials who are attempting to prosecute
certain "serious" crimes.96 Second, Title III contains a wiretap warrant
procedure that encompasses the requirements of the Katz and Berger
Courts, thus ensuring that the wiretap is permissible under the Fourth
Amendment.97 Finally, Title in includes a statutory exclusionary rule
that purports to suppress any evidence at any judicial proceeding that is
obtained in violation of Title hM. 9s
The fact that Title III allows the use of wiretaps to obtain evidence to
assist in the prosecution of certain crimes is itself very significant 99 It
represents a shift from the prior FCA scheme to one which recognizes
- See infra Part III.D.
- See infra Part III.E.92See CARR, supra note 53, § 1.1.
93 See CARR, supra note 53, § 1.1.
94 See Dorian L. Rowe, Wiretapping and the Modern Marriage: Does Title III Provide a Federal
Remedy for Victims of Interspousal Electronic Surveillance?, 91 DICK. L REv. 855, 859 (1987).
See generally CARR, supra note 53, at § 2.4.
92See Rowe, supra note 92, at 857-58; see also supra notes 52-64.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1994). Section 2516 of Title I contains a listing of offenses for which
law enforcement officials may seek wiretap warrants to assist in the investigation and
prosecution. Id.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1994). Section 2518 of Title III provides the process that law
enforcement officials must follow in order to successfully apply for a wiretap warrant Id.
See 18 U.S.C § 2515; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text (quoting the full text of
Section 2515).
-See 18 U.S.C. § 2516. Section 2516 of Title III contains a listing of offenses for which law
enforcement officials may seek wiretap warrants to assist in the investigation and
prosecution. Id.
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the need for law enforcement officials to use wiretapping techniques that
is not superceded by individuals' right to privacy when using the
telephone.' °° Congress struck a balance between these conflicting
interests whereby law enforcement officials may only obtain a wiretap
warrant to assist in the prosecution of several enumerated serious
crimes.' 0' Even where serious crimes are implicated, Title [] goes
further than the FCA or the states' attempts to regulate the use of
wiretaps in protecting constitutional prerogatives by ensuring that the
government does not abuse wiretaps in two ways') 2 First, Title El
mandates heightened procedural and evidentiary requirements in
applying for wiretap warrants. 0 3 Second, Title M specifies further
limitations and restrictions on the issuance and scope of wiretap
warrants. 104
To ensure legitimate wiretap use, Title I[ was drafted to meet the
"basic requirements" of the Fourth Amendment set forth by the Katz and
Berger Courts.'0 5 First, only "upper level" law enforcement officials or
government officers principally involved in the prosecution of criminal
conduct are able to authorize wiretap warrant applications.'0 6 Second,
100 See CARR, supra note 53, at § 2.1. Public dissatisfaction with the FCA occurred because it
typically failed to prohibit illegal private wiretapping yet denied law enforcement officials
any opportunity to use wiretaps, even in situations where they were investigating serious
crimes. Id. Two general themes existed in the legislative and political arena in drafting
legislation to replace the FCA. Id. First, there was unanimous support to eliminate illegal
wiretapping. Id. Second, there was great effort to develop a scheme to allow law
enforcement officials to wiretap with appropriate controls. ld.
'In See, e.g., 18 U.S.C § 2516(1) (indicating the enumerated crimes and conduct under which
the Attorney General, Assistant Attorneys General, and Deputy Attorneys General may
seek a wiretap); 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (indicating that state officials can seek a wiretap
warrant for "the offense of murder, kidnapping, gambling, robbery, bribery, extortion, or
dealing in narcotic drugs, marihuana or other dangerous drugs, or other crime dangerous
to life, limb, or property, and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year,
designated in any applicable State statute authorizing such interception, or any conspiracy
to commit any of the foregoing offenses"); 18 U.S.C. § 2516(3) (permitting a federal criminal
prosecutor to seek a wiretap warrant to aid in the prosecution of any federal felony);
United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT ACI) of 2001, Pub. L 107-56, § 203, 115 Stat.
272 (expanding the list of crimes for which a warrant could be obtained to include
terrorism and chemical weapons related crimes).
102 See infra notes 101-02
103 See infra note 104.
104 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516,2518 (1994).
105 See Sapp, supra note 6 at 184; see also supra note 84 and accompanying text.
M See 18 U.S.C. § 2516. The relevant text of Title III pertaining to the government officers
who are competent to authorize an application for a wiretap warrant is found at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2516, which provides:
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the requirements for seeking a wiretap warrant are more exacting in
terms of identifying the persons and nature of places to be tapped, as
well as the information that law enforcement officials expect to
overhear.'07 Third, a magistrate with jurisdiction over the matter must
(1) The Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate
Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General, any acting
Assistant Attorney General, or any Deputy Assistant Attorney General
or acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division
specially designated by the Attorney General, may authorize an
application to a Federal judge of competent jurisdiction for, and such
judge may grant in conformity with section 2518 of this chapter an
order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral
communications ....
(2) The principal prosecuting attorney of any State, or the principal
prosecuting attorney of any political subdivision thereof, if such
attorney is authorized by a statute of that State to make application to
a State court judge of competent jurisdiction for an order authorizing
or approving the interception of wire, oral, or electronic
communications, may apply to such judge for, and such judge may
grant in conformity with section 2518 of this chapter and with the
applicable State statute an order authorizing, or approving the
interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications ....
(3) Any attorney for the Government (as such term is defined for the
purposes of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure) may authorize
an application to a Federal judge of competent jurisdiction for, and
such judge may grant, in conformity with section 2518 of this title, an
order authorizing or approving the interception of electronic
communications ....
Id.
'- See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(a-f). The relevant text of Title I pertaining to the information
required to include in an application for a wiretap warrant is found at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2518(1)(a)-(0, which provides:
(a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making
the application, and the officer authorizing the application;
(b) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied
upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be
issued, including (i) details as to the particular offense that has been, is
being, or is about to be committed, (ii) except as provided in subsection
(11), a particular description of the nature and location of the facilities
from which or the place where the communication is to be intercepted,
(iii) a particular description of the type of communications sought to
be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person, if known, committing the
offense and whose communications are to be intercepted,
(c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other
investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous;
(d) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is
required to be maintained. If the nature of the investigation is such that
the authorization for interception should not automatically terminate
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make particularized findings in order to issue the wiretap warrant '
Finally, in issuing the wiretap order, the magistrate must place very
strict limitations on law enforcement officers' conduct and must specify
with particularity the scope of the wiretap warrant.' °9 In following this
when the described type of communication has been first obtained, a
particular description of facts establishing probable cause to believe
that additional communications of the same type will occur thereafter,
(e) a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous
applications known to the individual authorizing and making the
application, made to any judge for authorization to intercept, or for
approval of interceptions of, wire, oral, or electronic communications
involving any of the same persons, facilities or places specified in the
application, and the action taken by the judge on each such
application and
(t) where the application is for the extension of an order, a statement
setting forth the results thus far obtained from the interception, or a
reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain such results.
Id.
- See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(3)(a)-(d). The relevant text of Title III pertaining to the findings the
appropriate judge must make in order to issue a wiretap warrant is found at 18 US.C.
99 2518(3)(a)-(d), which provides:
(a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing,
has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated
in section 2516 of this chapter,
(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications
concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception;
(c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous;
(d) except as provided in subsection (11), there is probable cause for
belief that the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire, oral,
or electronic communications are to be intercepted are being used, or
are about to be used, in connection with the commission of such
offense, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by
such person.
Id.
'M See 18 U.SC. § 2518(4). The relevant text of Title Ill pertaining to the limitations and
specifications a judge must include in issuing a wiretap warrant is found at 18 US.C.
§ 2518(4), which provides:
Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire, oral,
or electronic communication under this chapter shall specify-
(a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are to
be intercepted,
(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as to
which, or the place where, authority to intercept is granted,
(c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to be
intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it
relates;
(d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the
communications, and of the person authorizing the application; and
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procedure, Title I attempts to protect the privacy rights of individuals
using telephones, while providing law enforcement officials with the
tools to effectively prosecute serious crimes.' 0
In addition, Title III purports to disallow the use of information
gathered from unauthorized wiretaps in any judicial proceeding."'
Section 2515 was included in Title Ill to prevent the lack of uniformity
created by the absence of an exclusionary rule that occurred under the
FCA. It does so by permitting, but not commanding, the exclusion of
information gathered in violation of Title 11." 2 Title I also attempts to
prohibit unauthorized interceptions by private individuals, as well as
law enforcement officials." 3 Section 2515 controls "whenever any wire
or oral communication" is intercepted in a manner violative of Title II. 14
However, a critical caveat of the Title I exclusionary rule is that
Congress indicated that the application of Section 2515 was to be
consistent with Fourth Amendment exclusionary jurisprudence."'
At the same time, Title III does not provide comprehensive
protection for all types of interpersonal communications that employ
telephone wires."'6 One of the most common types of electronic
surveillance devices used by law enforcement officials, known as a pen
(e) the period of time during which such interception is authorized,
including a statement as to whether or not the interception shall
automatically terminate when the described communication has been
first obtained....
Id.
110 See Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 48 (1972) (holding that "although Title III
authorizes invasions of individual privacy under certain circumstances, the protection of
privacy is an overriding Congressional concern"); S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 70 (1968), reprinted
in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2157 (stating that "[tihe major purpose of Title III is to combat
organized crime").
M See 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1994); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text (quoting the full
text of Section 2515).
11 See 18 U.S.C. § 2515; see infra Part IV.A.1 (commenting on the importance of Congress'
choice to use the word 'may' instead of 'shall'); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text
(quoting the full text of Section 2515).
113 See 18 U.S.C. § 2515. This is accomplished by Section 2515's proscription against
admitting "any" interception made in violation of Title III. Id.; see also supra note 9 and
accompanying text (quoting the full text of Section 2515).
114 18 U.S.C. § 2515; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text (quoting the full text of
Section 2515).
115 See S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 96 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2184-85.
Specifically, Congress did not intend "to press the scope of the suppression role beyond
present search and seizure law." Id.
116 See DIFFEE & LANDAU, supra note 1, at 153-54.
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register, is not covered by Title lI 1 A pen register is a passive
mechanical device that reports the numbers dialed on a telephone
without recording the contents of completed calls. " The Supreme Court
has held that the use of pen registers does not implicate Fourth
Amendment prerogatives because individuals have no justifiable
expectation of privacy in information they know the phone company
collects." 9
A related technology not covered by Title Ill, typically referred to as
Caller ID, is properly known as trap-and-trace devices.' 20 Trap-and-trace
devices operate exactly like pen registers except they record the phone
numbers of incoming calls, not outgoing calls.12' Finally, the interception
of cordless phone radio signals was previously not covered by Title ]].12
Although Congress acted to expand the coverage of Title IH in 1986 to
address these concerns,'2 the barriers Congress erected are nothing more
than pro-forma restrictions on the governmens use.124
117 United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 US. 159,161 n.l (1977).
I's Id. "(Pen registers] disclose only the telephone numbers that have been dialed - a means
of establishing communication. Neither the purport of any communication between the
caller and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed
is disclosed by pen registers." Id. at 167.
119 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979). The Court noted that individuals in
general do not entertain any expectation of privacy when dialing numbers with their
telephone. Id. In support of this proposition, the Court stated that all persons who use a
telephone must understand that they transmit the recorded information to the phone
company simply to allow the company to complete their call. Id. Next, the Court pointed
to telephone bills as a means of informing telephone users that equipment was specifically
employed to track the use of telephones for billing purposes and to ensure that users were
being billed the appropriate rates. Id. Finally, the Court noted that the telephone users are
alerted to the use of pen registers via phone books where phone companies typically
indicate that tracking of calls can be used to assist law enforcement officials of the "origin
of unwelcome and troublesome calls." Id. at 743.
12D See DiFFiE & LANDAU, supra note 1, at 117.
121 See DFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 1, at 117.
12 See United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that a conversation over
a cordless telephone did not fall within Title III's definition of wire communication, oral
communication, or electronic communication nor was there a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the use of cordless telephones due to the ease that such communications can be
intercepted).
123 See, e.g., Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, Title
I, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L No. 99-508,
100 Stat 1848 (1986).
124 See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 1, at 180. Any government attorney may seek a court
order to employ a pen register or a trap-and-trace devise without any showing of probable
cause. Id.
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B. The Addition of "Good Faith" to the Fourth Amendment Calculus Leading
to the Severance of Circuit Cohesiveness.
At the time Title Ill and the overall Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 were enacted, the analysis under Section 2515's
exclusionary rule, if applied consistently with the intent of Congress,
was practically equivalent to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary
rule.' 23 Section 2515's suppression remedy for violations of Title MI
appears to be consistent with a majority of the jurisprudence regarding
the suppression of evidence under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule; if the evidence was wrongfully obtained, the evidence was
commonly excluded.' 26
However, over time and prior to the enactment of Title LU, the
United States Supreme Court carved out several exceptions to its own
judicially established Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.' 27 One such
exception, developed in Walder v. United States, 128 is known as the
impeachment exception.129  Under the impeachment exception, the
government is allowed to introduce evidence gathered in violation of the
13 See S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 96 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112. 2185. It states
that Section 2515:
[Liargely reflects existing law. In applies to suppress evidence directly
(Nardone v. United States, 58 S.CL 275, 302 U.S. 379 (1937)) or
indirectly obtained in violation of the chapter. (Nardone v. United
States, 60 S.Ct. 266, 308 U.S. 338 (1939)). There is, however, no
intention to change the attenuation rule. See Nardone v. United States,
127 F.2d 521 (2d), certiorari denied, 62 S.Ct. 1296, 316 U.S. 698 (1942);
Wong Sun v. United States, 83 S.Ct. 407, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Nor
generally to press the scope of the suppression role beyond present
search and seizure law. See Walter v. United States, 74 S.Ct 354, 347
US. 62 (1954). But it does apply across the board in both Federal and
State proceeding.
Id.
2 See supra note 125.
1v See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, S SEARCH & SEIZURE § 11.6 (3d ed. 1996). Generally there are
three categories of exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule: (1) use of the
illegally gathered evidence to impeach a witness; (2) when the defense "opens the door";
and (3) in prosecutions for perjury. Id.; see also Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)
(allowing, for the limited purpose to impeach the defendant, the questioning of a
defendant about illegally seized heroin following a denial that narcotics were taken from
him); United States v. Raftery, 534 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1976) (incriminating statements
suppressed as fruit of illegal arrest were later admissible in a trial for perjury later before a
grand jury); United States ex rel. Castillo v. Fay, 350 F2d 400 (2d Cir. 1965) (admitting
evidence of illegally gathered facts previously excluded when defense counsel had opened
the door by asking whether narcotics had been found).
M 347 US. 62, 65 (1954).
129 See LAFAVE, supra note 127, at § 11.6(a).
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Fourth Amendment solely to impeach a witness. 130  Embedded in the
Walder Court's opinion is the determination that the benefits of using
illicitly obtained evidence to impeach a witness outweighs the cost of not
deterring future misconduct by law enforcement officials.'31
Following the logic in Walder, the Fifth Circuit in United States v.
Caron132 held the application of Title Il's exclusionary rule improper
where illicitly recorded wiretap evidence was used for the sole purpose
of impeaching a witness. 133  In Caron, the defendant was being
prosecuted for perjuring himself before a grand jury.134 Following the
close of the prosecution's case, Caron was the sole witness presented
130 Wader, 347 US. at 65; accord United States v. Echavarria-Olarte, 904 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir.
1990); Anthony v. United States, 667 F.2d 870 (st Cir. 1981).
13 Waider, 347 U.S. at 65. Justice Frankfurter writing for the majority indicated:
It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirmative
use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say that the
defendant can turn the illegal method by which evidence in the
Government's possession was obtained to his own advantage, and
provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths.
Such an extension of the Weeks doctrine would be a perversion of the
Fourth AmendmenL
Id. There was some dispute whether or not the Walder rationale remained viable after
Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), under the theory that such statements were
'distorted' in a way to make prior statements self-incriminating. See Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971). However, the Harris Court confirmed that Miranda did not
prohibit the use of prior inconsistent statements to impeach the defendant's testimony. Id.
at 226. Likewise, the Harris Court reiterated the position that use of such information,
although gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment, was not to be excluded, stating7
The impeachment process here undoubtedly provided valuable aid to
the jury in assessing petitioner's credibility, and the benefits of this
process should not be lost, in our view, because of the speculative
possibility that impermissible police conduct will be encouraged
thereby. Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on
proscribed police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows when the
evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case
in chief.
Id. at 225.
1- 474 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1973).
3 d. at 509.
'3 Id. at 507. Specifically, Caron was indicted for twice perjuring himself before a grand
jury on April 7, 1971. Id. The first count of the indictment charged Caron with perjuring
himself when he denied that he had ever participated in bookmaking. Id. The second
count of the indictment came when he denied that he knew a person named Howard
Gardner. Id. During the trial that began in 1972, Caron admitted that at the time of his
grand jury appearance, he was 'mistaken' when he denied that he knew Gardner. Id.
Caron and Gardner were well-acquainted. Id. However, Caron continued to deny that he
was involved in any bookmaking operations. Id.
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during the defense's case-in-chief.13 During Caron's cross-examination,
Caron denied that he was a bookkeeper in an illegal gambling business
or that he had any interaction with "bookies."' 36  Following Caron's
testimony, the government moved to enter into evidence information
from an illegal wiretap to rebut Caron's testimony.'37 Without an
evidentiary hearing to ascertain the validity of the wiretap itself, the
district court allowed the wiretap evidence to be admitted solely for the
purpose of impeachment. The court held that Caron "opened the door"
for evidence probative of his truthfulness.' 38
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit, again following the Court's logic in
Walder, held that admission into evidence of the information from the
assumingly illegal wiretap was appropriate. 139 In following the Walder
analysis, the Fifth Circuit indicated that there was no violation of the
Fourth Amendment.140 The Fifth Circuit examined whether or not the
result should differ from that arrived at in WaIder because of the Title III
exclusionary rule.' 4 1 After examining the legislative history of Title I,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that exclusion of the evidence under Section
2515 would be inappropriate because suppression would defeat the
intent behind Title III.142
Another significant exception to the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary rule is "good faith.""43 In United States v. Leon,'" the United
States Supreme Court held it appropriate to admit at trial evidence
135 Id.
1Id. at 507-08. During the cross-examination, Caron admitted that he was in contact with
a Louis Figueredo and had placed some bets on 'two or three" football games. Id. at 508.
When further questioned by the prosecutor, Caron denied that Caron and Figueredo were
involved in bookmaking operations. Id.
137 Id. The tape recordings that were played to the court consisted of telephone
conversations between Caron and Figueredo, the substance of which was characterized by
an expert witness as "the argot of professional bookmakers." Id.
139 United States v. Caron, 474 F.2d 506,508 (5th Cir. 1973).
1391d. at 510; see also infra notes 14042.
140 Caron, 474 F.2d at 509; see also supra note 127 (indicating the Supreme Court's position
that use of the exclusionary rule in a manner that precludes prosecutors from using
evidence to dispute allegations of criminal defendants is contradictory to the purposes of
the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule).
141 Caron, 474 F.2d at 509. The Fifth Circuit based its decision on both who could make a
motion to suppress under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) and the legislative history behind Section
2515's exclusionary rule. Id. at 509-10; see also supra note 125 (indicating the relevant text of
Section 2515's legislative history that the Fifth Circuit refers to when arriving at its
decision).
10 Caron, 474 F.2d at 509.
4 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).
1- 468 US. 897 (1984).
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obtained through a defective warrant when law enforcement officials
held an objectively reasonable, "good faith" reliance on the validity of
the warrant at the time it was executed. 45 In deciding Leon, the Court
indicated that the propriety of suppression is contingent upon the costs
and benefits of deterring future misconduct by law enforcement'"
Under the Leon good faith analysis, courts are to deny law enforcement
officials the use of illicitly obtained evidence whenever those officials
acted inappropriately and suppression would deter similar misconduct
in the future.14
7
However, the good faith doctrine does not give carte blanche to law
enforcement officials to disregard the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.148 Law enforcement officials are required to have acted in
an objectively reasonable manner for the good faith exception to
adhere.149 Thus, the good faith exception will not avert suppression of
evidence in situations where the law enforcement officer knows, or
145 Id. at 913; see Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1995) (extending the Leon good faith
rationale for search warrants to include arrest warrants that were erroneously reported to
law enforcement officials as still valid); see also infra note 146 (indicating the rationale
behind the Court's decision in Leon).
14 See Leon, 468 US. at 906-08. The Court first indicated that, despite the fact the evidence
obtained was gathered in a way that violated the Fourth Amendment, the evidence was
"inherently trustworthy." Id. at 907. The Court continued by stating the only reason there
was a Fourth Amendment violation was because the magistrate, not the police, erred in
granting the search warrant Id. The Court indicated that the substantial social costs
imposed by the exclusionary rule result in some guilty defendants going free or receiving
lighter sentences. Id. When "law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith or
their transgressions have been minor," the benefits conferred on the defendants in such
cases is disproportionately large. Id. at 908.
147 Id. at 922- In reviewing the basis underlying the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule,
the Court noted that
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes
that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent,
conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing
to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope
to instill in those particular investigating officers, on in their future
counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused.
Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith,
however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.
Id. at 919 (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975)). Based on that line of
reasoning, the Court "conclude[d ] that the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by
suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently
invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion." Id. at 922.
148 See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations on the
applicability of the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule).
149See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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should have known, that the search was illegal at the time the search or
seizure took place.'"o
The meaning and parameters of the good faith exception to the
Fourth Amendment are reflected in the "clean hands" doctrine. 15 1 The
only difference between the two doctrines is who actually conducts the
search or seizure.152 In instances where a state actor is involved in a
legally questionable search or seizure, "good faith" is the proper
terminology to use. 153 In situations involving questionable searches or
seizures by a private actor, the proper term to use is "clean hands.""4
Because the difference between the good faith and clean hands
doctrines are relatively minute, all of the requirements and parameters of
the good faith doctrine apply equally to a clean hands analysis. 55
Therefore, clean hands should also only avert suppression of evidence
where law enforcement officials have an objectively reasonable reliance
on the validity of the private search or seizure at the time the
information was received."6 As such, clean hands will not prevent
suppression in instances where law enforcement officials knew, or
150 Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (quoting Peltier, 422 U.S. at 542 ); see also LAFAVE, supra note 41, at §
1.3 (noting four different situations where the Supreme Court has specifically indicated
that the Leon good faith exception will not avert suppression under the Fourth
Amendment's exclusionary rule). The first situation is in cases where law enforcement
officials procure a warrant by providing material information that is intentionally or
recklessly untrue. Leon, 468 U.S. at 897 (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)).
The second situation is where the law enforcement officials are aware the magistrates have
"wholly abandoned their judicial role." Id. (quoting Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S.
319 (1979)). A third situation is when the warrant itself is so lacking of indicia of probable
cause that any reasonable officer would know that the warrant is invalid. Id. (quoting
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring)). The final situation arises
where the warrant is so facially defective that any reasonable officer could not think that it
is valid. Id. (comparing Leon's companion case, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981,
988-991 (1984)).
151 See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint Mach. Co., 324 US. 806, 814-15 (1945)
(holding that "dean hands" is essentially a vehicle for the implementation of the "good
faith" doctrine); see also Castle v. Cohen, 840 F.2d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that
"clean hands" is simply another expression of "good faith").
1S2 See supra note 151.
153 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 897.
lu See supra note 151.
105 See supra note 151.
1-% See Leon, 468 U.S. at 897.
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should have known, that the information from the private action could
not be used in criminal prosecution. 157
C. Fourth Amendment and Section 2515 Exclusionary Rules - Is There Cross-
Compatibility?
With the application of the good faith doctrine and the clean hands
doctrine to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule, the next question
is whether such developments have any bearing on the applicability of
Section 2515 of Title Ill. Ordinarily, as a matter of policy, courts are to
give effect to the plain meaning of the laws they are asked to interpret1'5
However, in instances where the plain language of a statute requires an
absurd result, or alternatively, a result contrary to the intent behind the
legislation, courts are to give effect to the intent of the legislation rather
than the plain language. 159 Therefore, for statutory analysis to be based
on legislative intent rather than plain language, there must be a showing
that the plain language, as applied in a particular situation, would defeat
the legislative intent 160
Before attempting to examine the cross-compatibility of the clean
hands exception to Title III, it is important to note that, in examining the
good faith exception, courts have clearly followed the legislative intent
of Title ll by refusing to apply Section 2515's exclusionary rule.161 In
several cases, the good faith exception has been applied to Title Ill
situations involving paperwork errors not implicating privacy
interests.' 62 Therefore, it is fair to suggest that, in terms of wiretap
157 See supra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing specific situations where the
applicability of the good faith rationale has been disallowed because the law enforcement
officials involved knew, or should have known, that the warrants they were executing were
defective in some manner).
Is See United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534,543 (1940).
'5 Id.; see also Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) (noting that a
court may look at the intent of the legislature in place of the plain language in instances
where "the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with
the intentions of its drafters"); Ozawa v. United States, 260 US. 178,194 (1922) (holding
that the plain language of a statute is not determinative when such language "leads to an
unreasonable result plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole"); Ecee,
Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 611 F.2d 554, 564 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that "[a]
construction of a statute leading to unjust or absurd consequences should be avoided").
16 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
161 See infra notes 162-71 and accompanying text (discussing cases where minor technical
defects were found not to destroy the fruits of wiretap warrants executed with good faith
by the executing law enforcement officials).
162 See United States v. Donovan, 429 US. 413, 439 (1977). In Donovan, the United States
Supreme Court decided that suppression was not warranted under Title III's exclusionary
rule in light of the good faith exhibited by the law enforcement officials in their inadvertent
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warrant requirements, the courts have applied the cost and benefit
process behind the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule exceptions to
Title mI's statutory exclusionary rule.13
In addition, the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Underhill'" held that
application of Title Il's exclusionary rule is inappropriate in situations
where defendants attempt to shield themselves from their own illegal
wiretaps."6 In Underhill, the defendants were charged as co-conspirators
in an illegal gambling business in violation of state and federal laws.'"
In operating the gambling business, the defendants used a telephone to
exchange gambling information and place bets." 7 In the course of
violation of two provisions of Title 111. Id. The Courts decision was based on the assertion
that the violated provisions were not central to the statutory purpose of protecting against
unauthorized wiretapping. Id. at 437; see also United States v. Chavez, 416 US. 562, 572,
574-76 (1974) (holding that in the absence of bad faith on the part of law enforcement
officials, suppression of evidence derived from technical violations of statutory provisions
of Title III that are not "central" to the purpose of preventing unauthorized wiretapping is
not warranted); United States v. Moore, 41 F.3d 370, 376 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that the
facial deficiency of a wiretap warrant not including the judicial officer's signature was a
technical defect when the judge had made appropriate findings and intended to enter the
appropriate wiretap order).
'63See generally Moore, 41 F.3d at 374. Under the Donovan and Chavez rationale, every circuit
asked to suppress wiretap information has refused to do so in instances of minor technical
deficiencies. d.; see also United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368,379 (3d Cir. 1989) (refusing to
suppress wiretap evidence because wiretap warrant was missing a page that contained
information required by Title Ill relating to the official authorizing the wiretap warrant
application and the agency executing the wiretap); United States v. Swanr, 526 F.2d 147,
149 (9th Cir. 1975) (declining to suppress evidence gathered from a wiretap when the
wiretap application was signed by an official not designated by Title Ill but made with
assent of the correct officials under the statutory scheme); United States v. Joseph, 519 F.2d
1068, 1071 (5th Cir. 1975) (refusing to suppress evidence gathered fror a wiretap where the
wiretap warrant application was approved by the Attorney General but signed by an
official whose statutory authority to do so had lapsed); United States v. Vigi, 515 F.2d 290,
293 (6th Cir. 1975) (declining to suppress evidence gathered from a wiretap actually
authorized by the Attorney General but signed for by an Acting Assistant Attorney General
on the wiretap warrant application); United States v. Aon, 513 F.2d 513, 517-19 (3d Cir.
1975) (holding that although a wiretap warrant application is facially deficient when signed
by an Acting Assistant Attorney General because such officials lack statutory authority
under Title M, such a deficiency was insufficient to warrant suppression of evidence
gathered under the wiretap warrant).
1- 813 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1987).
6 Id. at 112.
16
6 Id. at 107. Defendants were charged with the violation of 18 US.C. 1955 (1982), which
makes it a crime to operate a gambling business when the forum state's laws prohibit such
operations. Id. at 108. Additionally, they violated TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-6602(e) (1982),
which criminalizes the making and possession of gambling records. Id.
1
67 Id. at 107. During the search of the alleged gambling den, the federal agents found large
amounts of gambling paraphernalia, tape recorders attached to two telephones, and fifteen
audiocassettes. Id
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business, a few of the defendants used recording devices in wiretapping
their telephone conversations. '" These recordings were used to record
bets in an effort to provide indisputable evidence to challenge bettors
later contesting both the existence and the amounts of their bets."69 The
defendants, in attempting to suppress the recordings of the telephone
conversations, contended that the recordings were made illegally and,
therefore, had to be suppressed under Title fIl.' The Sixth Circuit
refused to apply Section 2515's suppression remedy for an "aggrieved
person" to shield people from their own consequences because the result
would be directly at odds with the legislative intent."'
S( Id.
169 Id. At trial, there was no dispute about the purpose of the tape recordings. One
defendant, Daniel Rokitka, while in the presence of his attorney, indicated that the tapes
were employed to serve two purposes. Id. at 108. First, the tapes were used to provide a
record of bets made. Id. Second, the tapes were used in a loss-control effort to provide a
record of the wager amount to prevent losing bettors from attempting to downplay their
bets. Id. In fact, Underhill himself was recorded on one of the tapes explaining that the he
"recorded everything to correct the problem of bettors trying to change the amounts of
their bets after losing." Id.
170 United States v. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 108 (6th Cir. 1987). The government originally
sought to have the audiocassettes admitted on the theory that there was no Title Ill
violation to trigger Section 2515's suppression remedy. Id. In support of its position, the
government suggested that the audiocassettes were legally made under 18 USC. §
2511(2)(d), which states:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting
under color of law to intercept a wire or oral communication where
such person is a party to the communication or where one of the
parties to the communication has given prior consent to such
interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose
of committing any criminal or tortuous act in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State....
18 U.S.C. §2511(2)(d) (1982). The district court, finding this language unambiguous, felt
"compelled to comply with its command." Underhill, 813 F.2d at 108. The Sixth Circuit
noted the district court judge's concern in applying the Title III exclusionary rule by
stating: "During the evidentiary hearing the district judge noted the anomaly created by
the defendants' motions: [T]his is the first time I've ever had defendants ... come in and
... say... I admit I was being unlawful and, therefore, you can't use the evidence. It's a
little bit awkward." Id.
171 Underhill, 813 F.2d at 112 The reasoning of the Sixth Circuit was that it was "clear that
Congress did not intend for § 2515 to shield the very people who committed the unlawful
interceptions from the consequences of their wrongdoing." Id. The courts reasoning was
based upon language in Title III's legislative history that "[the perpetrator must be denied the
fruits of his unlawfid actions in civil and criminal proceedings." Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 90-1097
at 72 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112 2156).
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D. The Breakdown in Telecommunications - Where the Circuits Split
The First Circuit initially examined whether governmental clean
hands should preclude suppression of wiretap evidence at trial under
Section 2515 in United States v. Vest.17. Vest involved a prosecution for
making false statements before a federal grand jury.'" The defendant
sought to suppress a wiretap recording by arguing that one of the others
charged in the bribery conspiracy made the recording in furtherance of
their criminal motives.174 The First Circuit advanced two theories in
making its decision. 17' First, the Vest court opined that a clean hands
exception is generally inappropriate in Title III scenarios based on the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Gelbard v. United States, 76
which stated that the "protection of privacy was an overriding
Congressional concern." 177  Second, the First Circuit rejected a clean
"7 813 F.2d 477, 477-79 (1st Cr. 1987).
17 Id. at 479. After being granted immunity from his involvement in a bribery conspiracy,
Vest testified that he did not participate in the conspiracy nor did he ever take any money
from one of the participants. Id. Following those statements before the grand jury, the
federal prosecutor played a recording that appeared to overhear Vest speaking with some
of the conspirators, but Vest denied that it was his voice on the recording. Id. Following
Vest's testimony, the grand jury indicted Vest on three counts of making false declarations
before a grand jury, with one count directed towards Vest's denial that it was his voice
recorded on the tape. Id.
174 Id. As part of the conspiracy, Vest acted as an intermediary and was given $35,000 by the
principal target of the grand jury inquiry to give to the recipient of the bribe. Id. Without
Vest's knowledge, his transaction and discussion was electronically recorded in an effort to
generate a receipt in the event the recipient of the bribe claimed that he was never paid off.
Id.
175 Id. at 480-84.
176 408 U.S. 41 (1972). It may be questioned if Gelbard is an appropriate case to attempt to
import and apply in the context of whether on not clean hands should preclude
suppression, as Gelbard dealt with a situation where law enforcement officials themselves
were involved in the illegal interception of wire communications. Id. at 43. Additionally,
only three justices in the majority of the 5-4 plurality necessarily subscribed to the assertion
many courts have subsequently ascribed to it. Id. at 41. In fact, justice White in his
concurring opinion decided the issue on the lack of good faith by law enforcement officials
because they participated in the illegal wiretapping. Id. at 70 (White, J., concurring).
17 United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477, 480 (1st Cir. 1987). In reaching this conclusion, the
First Circuit acknowledges the District Court's decision to examine Title IllI's legislative
history due to the appearance of a conflict between the legislative history and the plain
language, specifically the Section 2515 exclusionary rule. Id. However, at first, the First
Circuit appears to simply dismiss the need to examine the legislative history by noting the
Gelbard Court's statement that "the protection of privacy was the overriding Congressional
concern" at the time Title III was enacted. Id. at 481 (quoting Gelbard, 408 U.S. at 48). The
Vest court also acknowledged the Gelbard Court's statement that the need for Section 2515
to provide "protection for 'the victim of an unlawful invasion of privacy' could not be more
clear." Id. (quoting Ge/baN, 408 U.S. at 50). According to the First Circuit's logic, because
the disclosure of wire communications would necessarily entail another breach of a
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hands exception for use in the prosecution of a crime that the
government, in its own investigation, could not have obtained a warrant
to wiretap for in the first place.'
78
It was not until eight years later, when United States v. Murdock"
9
reached the Sixth Circuit, that the issue of the admissibility of evidence
obtained with governmental clean hands arose again.'" Murdock
involved a situation of inter-spousal wiretapping when a wife became
suspicious of her husband's personal and business affairs.' Acting on
her suspicions, the wife installed recording devices on two telephones -
both attached to the business lines located in the Murdocks' residence. 12
Later, based on public events and information gathered from her
wiretaps, Mrs. Murdock believed that her husband was involved in a
bribery scheme.'8 3 As a result, Mrs. Murdock anonymously sent a
person's privacy, even if the government were the innocent recipient of illegally
intercepted information, the government cannot introduce the information at trial. Id.
17 Id. at 481-84. In this part of the opinion, the First Circuit made an abrupt aboutface and
decided to look into Title IIl's legislative history. Id. Specifically, the First Circuit noted
that Congress did not intend "to press the scope of the suppression role beyond present
search and seizure law." Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 96 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2184-85). Then the First Circuit, in apparent contradiction of its earlier
support of the Gelbard decision, decided to put Title Ill back within the context of the larger
piece of legislation that includes Title III, the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act Id. It noted the legislative history stating "[blecause of the importance of privacy,
such interceptions should be limited to major offenses." Id. All of the crimes for which law
enforcement could obtain a wiretap warrant were selected "either because it is intrinsically
serious or it is characteristic of organized crime." Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 97
(1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2186). The First Circuit noted "by enumerating
those crimes deemed serious enough to justify interception and disclosure of private
communications, Congress intended to strike a balance between Title ll's twin purposes of
protecting privacy and recognizing the importance and legality of intercepting
communications for the purpose of combating crime." Id. In concluding its analysis, the
First Circuit simply looked to 18 U.S.C. § 2516 - the list of crimes for which law
enforcement can obtain a wiretap warrant. Id. It did not find the offense Vest was charged
for that would have provided a basis for appeal. Id. Because Congress had not decided
that the need to prosecute that particular offense outweighed privacy concerns, the First
Circuit declined to "upset the balance struck by Congress" or allow the government to use
the illicitly gathered evidence at trial. Id.
1M 63 F.3d 1391 (6th Cir. 1995).
180 Id.
181 Id. at 1392.
1 2 Id.
183Id. at 1393. At the time of the interceptions Mr. Murdock was the President of the
Detroit School Board. Id. at 1392. What piqued Mrs. Murdock's suspicion was a
newspaper report describing actions taken by the school board involving a contract for
milk from a local dairy. Id. at 1393. Mrs. Murdock suspected that her husband was
involved in a bribery scheme based on her interceptions of telephone conversations
between her husband and an official at the dairy farm. Id.
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portion of the recordings to the party disadvantaged by the bribery
scheme, who in turn sent the recording to the county prosecutor and a
local newspaper.'" Upon receipt of the tapes, the newspaper
investigated the situation and published a report outlining Murdock's
bribery scheme. 185 Based on the newspaper report, federal agents began
an investigation, and Murdock was eventually indicted for tax evasion
for failing to include the bribes in his income tax filing.'"
Murdock moved to have the telephone recording sent to the
newspaper suppressed under Section 2515.'8 The Sixth Circuit began by
acknowledging that Mrs. Murdock's recordings of her husband's
telephone conversations violated Title in.8 8 The Murdock court then
pointed to the decision in Vest and its underlying reliance on Gelbard and
noted the Murdocks' situation was different than that in Gelbard, a
situation in which the law enforcement officials could not have had clean
hands because it was the officials themselves who executed the illegal
wiretaps. 89 After determining that the plain language of Title Ill did not
contemplate a clean hands scenario, the Murdock court examined Title
Ill's legislative history. 19° Based on the legislative history, which
1841d.
18 United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391,1393 (6th Cir. 1995).186 Id. Specifically, the indictment charged Mr. Murdock failed to include the $90,000 bribe
he received from the winning dairy farm who won the dairy contract in his income tax
filings. Id.
1v Id.
188 Id. at 1400. In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit first concluded that an
interception had occurred under Title Il. id. at 1395. Then the Sixth Circuit determined
that Mrs. Murdocks recordings were not protected by the telephone extension exemption.
Id. at 13%. The Murdock Court continued by noting that the 'Ordinary Course of Business'
exemption to Title Ill found at 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i) was not applicable to the case, as
Mrs. Murdock made indiscriminate recordings of incoming and outgoing telephone calls.
Id. at 1397. Finally, the Sixth Circuit noted the line of cases that dearly operated against the
establishment of an inter-spousal exception to Title III. Id. at 1397-99.
189 Id. at 1401. Specifically, the Sixth Circuit opined:
The point of Gelbard was that if the government was eventually shown
to have illegally intercepted the conversations, then the witness was
entitled under Title III to have that evidence suppressed and
completely excluded from any line of questioning in any proceeding.
including the grand jury proceeding. To cite Gelbard as standing for
the proposition that the entire purpose of Title Ill is to prevent
victimization in the form of invasion of privacy goes too far.
Id.; see also supra note 175 (noting other criticisms of the majority decision in Gelbard).
190 Murdock, 63 F.3d at 1402- The Sixth Circuit also observed that the Supreme Court had
noted approvingly that the legislative history of Section 2515 indicated that the suppression
remedy was not intended "generally to press the scope of the suppression role beyond
present search and seizure law." Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 96 (1968), reprinted in
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indicated that the suppression of evidence was to be applied consistently
with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Sixth Circuit examined the
facts under a Fourth Amendment analysis.' 9' In doing so, the Sixth
Circuit found that suppression was unwarranted because there was no
risk of encouraging future law enforcement misconduct.1 9 As such, the
Sixth Circuit grafted a clean hands exception into Title M's exclusionary
rule. 1
93
In re Grand Jury 94 is the latest case to analyze whether a clean hands
exception allows wiretap evidence gathered in violation of Title III to be
admissible at trial when the government took no part in the illegal
interception.19  In In re Grand Jury, the appellant was the target of a
grand jury investigation.'19 Over time, the grand jury became aware that
an individual had taped the appellant's telephone conversations using
an illegal wiretap.'9 The grand jury then sought to obtain those tapes
through a subpoena duces tecum.'" The individual refused to surrender
the tapes and was held in contempt.'I
The Third Circuit advanced two theories in rejecting the clean hands
exception to preclude suppression. 200 First, the Third Circuit noted that
the plain language of a statute could be displaced if at odds with the
1968 U.S.CC.A.N. 2112, 2159-61); see also Scott v. United States, 436 US. 128, 139 (1978);
Alderman v. United States, 394 US. 165,175-76 (1969).
191 See Murdock, 63 F.3d at 1402-3. In deciding that it was appropriate to examine the
situation under a Fourth Amendment analysis, the Murdock court indicated that "[tihere is
nothing in the legislative history which requires that the government be precluded from
using evidence that literally falls into its hands." Id.
192 Id. "We note... that government agents are charged with no wrongdoing and that to
suppress here would have no impact on the future conduct of law enforcement officials...
these are factors that counsel against the necessity of suppression." Id. at 1402 (quoting
United States v. Baranek, 903 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1990) (emphasis omitted)).
193 Id. at 1403.
1- 111 F.3d 1066 (3d Cir. 1997).
195Id
.
196 [d. at 1068. Because the investigation was still ongoing in the grand jury and no formal
charges had been announced, the Third Circuit appropriately declined to indicate the
charges the target of the investigation was suspected of committing. Id.
19 Id. at 1069. Apparently, the individual had installed recorders on the telephones in her
household. id. Using the recorders, the individual was able to record conversations of
telephone calls originating from and coming into her home. Id.
196 Id.
19 Id.
2m In re Grand Jury, 111 F.3d 1066,1078 (3d Cir. 1997).
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intent behind the statute.20' However, the Third Circuit stated that there
was, in fact, no conflict between the legislative history of Section 2515
and its plain language.2 2 Second, the Third Circuit argued that even if
there was a conflict, there was no legislative history that would provide a
basis to infer a clean hands exception. °3 Absent, however, from the
Third Circuit's analysis of the legislative history was any mention that
Congress did not intend the application of the Act's exclusionary rule "to
press the scope of the suppression role beyond present search and
seizure law."2°4
E. Finding the Links Between the Lines and Restoring Connectivity Among the
Circuits
The three cases at the Federal Appellate Court level have yielded
three different results.205 On one hand, while arguing that there is no
overarching clean hands exception to Section 2515, the Vest court
appears to suggest it would find an exception to the suppression of
evidence for certain specified crimes enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2516.206
On the other hand, based on its reading of the legislative intent behind
Section 2515, the Murdock court clearly found a bright-line clean hands
exception to Section 2515 whenever the government innocently receives
information via an illegal wiretap.207 Finally, the In re Grand Jury
decision stands for the proposition that the mere suggestion of a clean
2m Id. at 1078; see also supra note 159 and accompanying text (listing cases supporting the
proposition that the plain language of a statue can be displaced if it will produce a result
defeating the intent of the legislation).
"2In re Grand Jury, 111 F.3d at 1077. In arguing that there was no conflict between the plain
language and the legislative intent, the Third Circuit relies on the assertion of legislative
intent advanced by Gelbard. Id. at 1078.
2 Id. The Third Circuit commented on the legislative intent without looking at the
legislative history of Title Ill that "[elven if we were prepared to ignore the literal language
of the statute... we find no other indication that Congress intended the clean hands
exception the government would have us read into §§ 2515 and 2511(l)(c)." Id. at 1077.
"The statutory structure makes it clear that any interceptions of communications and
invasions of individual privacy are prohibited unless expressly authorized in Title Ill." Id.
2H Id. (finding no mention of the quoted legislative history found at S. REP. No. 90-1097, at
% (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112. 2184-85).
2 See supra Part III.B.
w6 See supra note 178 and accompanying text (discussing the second analysis in the Vest
decision).
m7 See supra notes 179-93 and accompanying text (discussing the decision and rationales
behind the Sixth Circuit's action in Murdock).
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hands exception to Section 2515 should be rejected based on the plain
language of the Section.208
However, there is a middle road between the two 'hard-line'
positions of Murdock and In re Grand Jury that follows along the lines of
the second analysis pursued in Vest. It is possible to identify, and
appropriate for the judiciary to apply, a model qualified clean hands
exception that satisfies both the plain language of Title IlI and the
legislative intent behind Section 2515.209 Such a qualified clean hands
exception would admit wiretap evidence from private wiretaps only
where law enforcement officials have clean hands and the wiretap is
probative of a crime enumerated by Section 2516.
IV. CONNECTING THE LINES - WHY A QUALIFIED CLEAN HANDS
EXCEPTION IS AN APPROPRIATE UPGRADE TO THE CURRENT
TITLE III SYSTEM
An analysis into the appropriateness of a model qualified clean
hands exception to Section 2515's exclusionary rule must examine two
factors. First, it is necessary to explore why a clean hands exception to
Section 2515 is appropriate.21 ° Second, it is important to examine the
totality of Title Ill to determine if any additional limitations on a clean
hands exception should be observed.2t Once the proper scope of a
qualified clean hands exception is defined, it is appropriate to explore
why evidence admissible under this exception satisfies the requirements
of the Fourth Amendment.21 2 In doing so, it will become clear that
evidence proffered by law enforcement officials consistent with a
qualified clean hands exception to Title III should be admitted at trial,
despite concerns about the practical consequences of its application to
the exclusionary rule.21 3 As such, the model qualifed clean hands
exception advocated in this Note should be read into the Section 2515
exclusionary rule.214
2w See supra notes 194-203 and accompanying text (discussing the decision and rationales
behind the Third Circuit's decision in the case In re Grand Jury).
-s See mnfa Part IV.
210 See infra Part IV.A.
21 See infra Part IV.B.
212 See infra Part IV.C.1.
23 See infra Part IV.C.2.
-
4 See infra Part W.D.
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A. A Clean Hands Exception is Appropriate Given the Text and Legislative
History of Section 2515
In exploring why a clean hands exception to the statutory
exclusionary rule of Section 2515 is appropriate, one can travel two
different paths. The first path examines both the actual language of
Section 2515's exclusionary rule, which makes suppression discretionary,
and cases which use that discretion to refuse to suppress evidence
gathered in violation of Title M.215 The second path looks at the
legislative history of Title II's exclusionary rule, which commands that
Section 2515 be applied in a manner consistent with the Fourth
Amendment's exclusionary rule.22'
1. The Text of Section 2515 and the Judiciary's Application of a Good
Faith Exception
The plain language of the exclusionary rule permits judicial
discretion in suppressing evidence because Congress elected to use the
word "may" instead of "shall" in Section 2515.27 Evidence obtained
from an illegal wiretap does not face mandatory suppression because
Congress made the conscious choice to refuse imposition of the
mandatory application of Section 2515's exclusionary rule.2 18 Instead,
the exclusionary rule displays flexibility in situations involving Title lI
violations, much like the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule, which
necessarily includes the application of the good faith doctrine and its
alter ego, the clean hands exception. This appraisal of the language of
Section 2515 is appropriate given the legislative intent to adhere to the
then current search and seizure law.2 19 Based on the plain language of
Section 2515, a clean hands exception to Section 2515's exclusionary rule
should apply.
- See infra Part W.A.1.
216 See infra Part IV.A.
217 See 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1994); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text (quoting full text
of Section 2515).
2 See Haig v. Agee, 453 US. 280 (1981). The Haig Court indicated that the term "may
"expressly recognizes substantial discretion." Id. at 294 n.26; see also Koch Refining Co. v.
Dep't of Energy, 504 F. Supp. 593 (1980). "May" is a term of permission and is construed
"to vest discretionary power." Koch, 504 F. Supp. at 596.
219 See S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 96 (1968), reprinted in 1968 US.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2184-85.
Congress declared that the Section 2515 exclusionary rule "largely reflected" the
jurisprudence regarding the suppression of evidence under the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary rule. Id. Specifically, in the legislative history of Section 2515, Congress
indicated that the exclusionary rule was not intended "to press the scope of the
suppression role beyond present search and seizure law." Id.
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Following this logic, the judiciary has refused to order the
suppression of wiretap evidence gathered in every situation involving a
violation of Title I. 2  Most of the refusals have arisen in situations
involving the application of a good faith analysis.22' Additionally, these
decisions consider the deterrance of misconduct by law enforcement
officials as an important factor. Inherent in these judicial determinations
is that clean hands is an appropriate factor given the discretionary nature
of Section 2515's exclusionary rule and that its application should be like
the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule. Therefore, it is appropriate
to read a clean hands exception into Section 2515 based on the
discretionary nature of the suppression remedy directed by the plain
language of the Act.
2. A Clean Hands Exception is Appropriate Since Application of Section
2515's Exclusionary Rule Would be Absurd and Contrary to
Congressional Intent
If, in the context of clean hands scenarios, the plain language of
Section 2515's exclusionary rule was interpreted to require the
unbending application of suppression, such a reading would produce an
absurd and contrary result to that intended by Congress. In such a
situation, the judiciary is to apply the legislative intent rather than the
plain language of the Actm For the judiciary to implement the
legislative intent, it must first be demonstrated that application of the
plain language, in a way rejecting a clean hands exception to Title I,
would create a result absurd or contrary to congressional intent. If the
analysis shows that rejection of a clean hands exception is contrary or
absurd, a clean hands exception to the Section 2515 exclusionary rule
must, ipso facto, be appropriate.
First, it must be recalled that the legislative intent of Section 2515
commands the judiciary to consistently apply the statutory exclusionary
rule with the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule.m Therefore, if the
2 See supra Part III.C.
m See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text (discussing the cases refusing to apply
Section 2515's exclusionary rule despite a clear violation of Title IIn).
MSee supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text (discussing the line of cases that allow a
court to ignore the plain language of a statute where the plain language would create an
absurd or contrary result in light of the legislative intent).
W See S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 96 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112. 2184-85.
Congress declared that the Section 2515 exclusionary rule "largely reflected" the
jurisprudence regarding the suppression of evidence under the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary rule. Id. Specifically, in the legislative history of Section 2515, Congress
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Section 2515 exclusionary rule were to be applied in a manner strictly
consistent with the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule, then Section
2515 would not bar the admission of any evidence gathered by law
enforcement officers with clean hands."4 This is because a private actor
conducted the illegal search.225 If the Section 2515 exclusionary rule were
read to preclude the application of a clean hands exception to Title MI
situations, there would be an obvious conflict. Because the intent behind
Title I was to make the Section 2515 exclusionary rule applicable only
when the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule requires suppression,
applying Section 2515 to suppress wiretap evidence, where the Fourth
Amendment would not, creates an absurd and contrary result to that
intended by the legislature.
Where an absurd and contrary result is achieved, one solution is to
"import" much of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule
jurisprudence into the interpretation and application of the Section 2515
exclusionary rule. Along with this annexation of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence follows one of the most significant aspects of that
jurisprudence, the good faith exception. As the good faith exception
operates as a function of the underlying premise behind the Fourth.
Amendment's exclusionary rule, it should be recognized as being part of
the search and seizure law at the time of Title fi's enactment zm Thus, if
the application of Section 2515's exclusionary rule were applied in a
manner consistent with congressional intent, which followed Fourth
Amendment exclusionary jurisprudence, the good faith exception, and
necessarily a clean hands exception, would be appropriate in the
application of the Section 2515 exclusionary rule.
Seemingly contrary to the reading of congressional intent and the
plain language of Section 2515 is the declaration by the Gelbard Court
that the "protection of privacy was the overriding congressional intent"
behind Section 2515's exclusionary rule.227 Reliance on the statement in
indicated that the exclusionary rule in Section 2515 was not intended "to press the scope of
the suppression role beyond present search and seizure law." Id.
224 See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
23See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text (discussing Burdeau and its progeny, which
hold that the admissibility of the fruit of private searches is unfettered by the Fourth
Amendment's exclusionary rule because the Fourth Amendment is focused only on state,
not private, action).
See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text (noting the development and application
of the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule is based upon its
purpose of deterring police misconduct).
2v Gelbard v. United States, 448 US. 41, 48 (1972); see supra note 176 and accompanying text
(noting the relevant statement from the Gelbard majority decision).
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Gelbard is largely misplaced for two reasons. First, only three justices
writing the majority opinion in a 5-4 plurality supported this assertion.m
Second, the statement is dicta because the issue before the Gelbard court
was simply whether Section 2515's exclusionary rule provides a basis for
witnesses to refuse to answer questions based on informationiathered
from an illegal wiretap conducted by law enforcement officials.
One of the concurring opinions did not stray but limited itself
exclusively to the determination of whether a grand jury witness may
raise Title I in refusing to answer questions.230 Interestingly, in his
concurring opinion, Justice White engaged in a good faith analysis by
weighing the appropriateness of the admissibility of wiretap evidence at
grand jury hearings. 231 Justice White ultimately voted with the majority
to reverse the contempt adjudications because of the police malfeasance
in executing the illegal wiretaps.232 Additionally, the majority opinion in
Gelbard deviates from the analysis of whether Section 2515 provides a
basis for grand jury witnesses to refuse to respond to questions based on
information gathered from an illegal wiretap.2 3 The majority decision
tends to extend beyond the true scope of Gelbard and, instead, address
the case of police malfeasance. 234
Thus, it is disingenuous to primarily rely on the "judicially-
articulated" assertion of legislative intent by only three justices writing
the Gelbard majority opinion as a counter-argument to the actual
legislative history of the Act Section 2515 was not intended "to press the
scope of the suppression role beyond present search and seizure law."
233
Additionally, this judicially asserted legislative history of Section 2515 is
MMSee supra note 176 (questioning the relevancy and precedential effect of statements
contained in the Gelbard majority opinion).
M See supra note 176 (questioning any reliance on the majority's averring to the judicial
assertion of legislative intent behind Title I1).
2 0 See Gelbard, 408 US. at 69-71 (White, J., concurring).
231 Id. at 71.
232 Id. at 70. Justice White in his concurring opinion indicated "that at least where the
United States has intercepted communications without a warrant in circumstances where
court approval was required, it is appropriate ... not to require the grand jury witness to
answer and hence further the plain policy of the wiretap statute." Id.
M22 See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
2 See generaUy Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
M2s See S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 96 (1968), reprinted in 1968 US.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2184-85. In the
legislative history of Section 2515, Congress indicated that the exclusionary rule in Section
2515 was not intended "to press the scope of the suppression role beyond present search
and seizure law." Id.
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nothing more than dicta.2 6 Although heavily relied upon by cases such
as In re Grand Jury and the first analysis of Vest, the argument founded
on these judicially-asserted presumptions of legislative intent do not
carry much, if any, precedential weight. Therefore, this opposing
assertion should not alone prevent the application of a clean hands
exception to Section 2515's exclusionary rule. A clean hands exception is
appropriate. Indeed, it is necessary to faithfully apply the congressional
intent behind the Section 2515 exclusionary rule.
B. Qualifying the Rule - Recognizing the Proper Limitations of a Clean Hands
Exception by other Legislative Commands of Title II
Because a clean hands exception to the Section 2515 exclusionary
rule is appropriate, the next step is to determine the corresponding scope
of the exception. First, an examination of the overall congressional
purpose in enacting Title Ml must occur. The second step is to examine
the text and legislative history of Title Ill to determine if any other
factors should limit the applicability of a clean hands exception. In
addition, it is helpful to examine case law applying Title In, which
provides additional insight on appropriate limitations of a clean hands
exception. In exploring the underlying policies in conjunction with the
text and legislative history of Title MI, an examination of the differing
approaches and results of the three federal circuit decisions reveals that
there is an appropriate "middle road." This middle road supports the
application of a qualified clean hands exception where law enforcement
officials have clean hands and the evidence is probative of crimes
enumerated under Section 2516.
The overarching policy embodied by Title Ill is the need to provide
law enforcement officials with tools, such as wiretaps, that are necessary
to combat criminal activity. 7  This policy innately recognizes the
importance and legality of using wiretaps in the prosecution of criminal
activity.28 Title Ell should be read in the context of the larger piece of
crime-fighting legislation, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street
Acts of 1968. Such a reading indicates that the legislators decided that, in
certain situations, the privacy interest implicated is overridden by the
z6 See supra notes 176, 227 (noting that the judicially asserted legislative intent behind
Section 2515 had nothing to do with the true issue involved in Getbard).
237 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (noting the broad support there was at the time
Congress enacted Title III to allowing law enforcement officers to use wiretapping
techniques to combat crime).
2m See United States v. Vest 813 F.2d 477,485 (1st Cir. 1987).
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need to provide law enforcement officials with the ability to gather
information using wiretaps.2 9
Title M attempts to satisfy this competing privacy interest in
essentially two different ways.240 First, the plain language of Section
2515 makes the application of suppression of evidence discretionary.2 4'
Second, Section 2516 inherently asserts that wiretap evidence may only
be used in criminal prosecutions where wiretap evidence is probative of
a crime enumerated in that section.242 Therefore, it can be deduced that
the privacy interests of individuals outweigh the need to provide law
enforcement officials with wiretaps to prosecute certain criminal acts.
Thus, individuals possess an uninfringeable privacy interest that cannot
be overcome by the interest of combating crimes in relation to crimes not
enumerated by Section 2516.243
As noted before, the three circuits in Vest, Murdock, and In re Grand
Jury have attempted to balance privacy and investigatory interests.2 44
However, the three conflicting circuits arrived at opposing positions.
The only practical difference between the three decisions is that each
gives too much effect to one interest to the detriment of the competing
social interests.
In many ways, the Murdock decision can be seen as deferring too
much to the law enforcement interest in wiretapping; Murdock suggests
that anytime law enforcement officials have clean hands, the illegally
gathered wiretap evidence should be admitted regardless of the crime
involved.245 Such an approach appears too expansive because it fails to
take into consideration Congress' limitation of situations where a
wiretap is an appropriate investigative technique, thus ignoring the
balancing of interests embodied in Section 2516. As such, Murdock's
M9 See supra notes 100-02 (discussing the legislative choice that overturned Congress'
previous stance that an individual's privacy interest absolutely superceded the need for
wiretapping in criminal investigation).
24 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (noting the opposition and apprehensiveness in
allowing law enforcement officials the ability to implement wiretapping techniques as part
of a criminal investigation).
241 See 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1994); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text (quoting the full
text of Section 2515).2
- See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1994).
2
- See 18 U.S.C. § 2516.
244 See suipra Parts III.D-E (discussing the three federal appellate court decisions attempting
to interpret and apply Section 2515).
w See supra notes 179-93 and accompanying text (discussing the rationales behind the
Murdock decision).
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broad clean hands exception under Section 2515's exclusionary rule is
not an appropriate statement of the law when considering the
congressional intent behind Title m.
In re Grand Jury can be read as giving too much weight towards the
policy of protecting individual privacy interests by stating that no clean
hands exception is ever appropriate.246 In re Grand Jury asserts that at no
time will any information gathered with clean hands by law enforcement
officials from an illegal wiretap be admitted into evidence despite
congressional intent indicating otherwise.247 In re Grand Jury clearly
infringes on the interest in providing law enforcement officials with the
tools necessary to combat crime. Such an interest necessarily precludes
an absolute individual privacy interest. Additionally, the In re Grand
Jury decision inaccurately depicts how the Section 2515 exclusionary rule
should be applied in light of the congressional intent in enacting Title IM.
Similar to In re Grand Jury, the Vest court, in its first analysis, affords
too much emphasis on the policy of protecting individual privacy
interests by finding a clean hands exception inappropriate.2 " The
second analysis in Vest follows an appropriate approach in illuminating
a middle road between the two inflexible positions established by
Murdock and In re Grand Jury. This second Vest analysis suggests a clean
hands exception should be appropriate only in situations where the
police can obtain a wiretap warrant to investigate crimes enumerated in
Section 2516.249 In making this second analysis, the Vest court indicates
that, by enumerating crimes for which a wiretap may be used, Congress
struck the appropriate balance between these two competing interests. 250
Section 2516 commands that no wiretap evidence should be allowed
unless probative of the crimes enumerated therein."' The plain
language of the statute controls because there is no contrary legislative
intent.252 As the second analysis in Vest suggests, Congress balances the
two competing interests by denying the use of wiretaps in situations not
246 See supra notes 194-204 and accompanying text (discussing the rationales behind the In re
Grand Jury decision).
247 See supra note 200 and accompanying text248 See supra notes 172-78 and accompanying text (discussing the first analysis in the Vest
decision).
249 See supra note 178 and accompanying text (examining the second analysis in the Vest
decision).
25 United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d at 477,483 (1st Cir. 1987).
25 See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1994).
= See generally S. REP. No. 97-1097, reprinted in 1968 US.C.CA.N. 2112.
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enumerated in Section 2516. Congress acquiesced to the needs of law
enforcement officials by permitting the use of wiretaps in investigations
of certain crimes. Section 2516 thus operates to limit the scope of any
clean hands exception to Section 2515's statutory exclusionary rule
implicity due to abrogating an absolute privacy interest by enumerating
certain crimes where wiretaps may be used legally. Therefore, the
proper scope of a qualified clean hands exception would only admit
evidence at trial where law enforcement officials have clean hands at the
time the information was received and the evidence is probative of a
crime enumerated in Section 2516.
C. A Qualified Clean Hands Exception Satisfies the Search and Seizure
Requirements of the Fourth Amendment and Other Fairness Concerns
After satisfying the qualified clean hands exception criteria under
Title Im, the question remains whether wiretap information is admissible.
The proper approach in resolving this question is articulated by Berger
and Katz.23 Additionally, it is important to examine what impact the
adoption of a model qualified clean hands exception to the Section 2515
exclusionary rule would have on the number of private illicit wiretaps.
1. A Qualified Clean Hands Exception to Title Ill's Exclusionary Rule
Inherently Complies with the Fourth Amendment
Under a Fourth Amendment analysis, wiretap evidence gathered
pursuant to a qualified clean hands exception should be admitted into
evidence at trial because of its nature as a private search. This is because
private searches are completely unfettered by the Fourth Amendment254
The only exception to this proposition occurs when the private actor is
influenced or acting on behalf of the state. 5  However, in a qualified
clean hands scenario, no danger of the private wiretapper acting as a
state agent arises because the law enforcement officials would know or
have reason to know that evidence was gathered from an illegal wiretap.
With such knowledge of the illegality of the wiretap, the law
enforcement officials involved would be deprived of their clean hands.
As such, wiretap evidence obtained under a qualified clean hands
3 See supm notes 66-84 and accompanying text (discussing the current approach of the
Court towards the implications of wiretaps on Fourth Amendment privacy interests).
2
N See supra notes 38,41 and accompanying text (discussing Burdeau and its progeny, which
recognize the limitation on the application of the Fourth Amendment to state actors).
25 See supra note 41 (comparing Burdeau and its progeny with cases involving private actors
acting on behalf of the state where an individual's Fourth Amendment privacy interest is
violated).
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exception to Section 2515's statutory exclusionary rule should be
admitted into evidence as the exception satisfies the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment.
2. The Adoption of this Model Qualified Clean Hands Exception to
Section 2515's Exclusionary Rule Should Not Provide Incentives to
Increase Illicit Private Wiretapping
Despite the appropriateness of a qualified clean hands exception,
one concern is that application of the exception to Title Ill's exclusionary
rule creates an incentive for private parties to illegally intercept wire
communications.256 The basis of the concern is that by adopting an
exception, the judiciary will encourage more illicit wiretaps by private
actors in light of the weak civil and criminal penalties available against
the private interceptor. This rationale further suggests that, in
practice, prosecutors will plea bargain with private interceptors to get
the illicitly obtained information and civil juries are reluctant to punish
private actors who merely fulfill their "civic duty" by reporting crimes to
law enforcement officials.258
While troubling on its face, this concern fails for two distinct reasons.
First, civil and criminal remedies provide alternative remedies that are
not factors taken into account in a Fourth Amendment good faith
analysis.2 9 Second, and more significantly, prosecutors will not enter
into plea agreements to obtain illegal private wiretap evidence because
then those prosecutors will have knowledge that the evidence was
gathered illegally when they "obtain it," thereby destroying their clean
hands.
The alternative civil and criminal remedies are not factors
considered in the good faith analysis as a part of the Fourth
Amendment's exclusionary rule calculus annunciated through Leon.'m
The Fourth Amendment does not apply to private search and seizures,
leaving only the question as to what extent will suppression deter future
misconduct by law enforcement officials.26' Therefore, the question of
256 See Hamilton, supra note 54, at 1506-11.
B7 See Hamilton, supra note 54, at 1506-11; see also supra note 10 (noting the civil and
criminal penalties for violating Title III).
2 See Hamilton, supra note 54, at 1511.
259 See supra note 32.
2w See supra note 144-46 and accompanying text (discussing the good faith analysis
determinative factor as being the deterrence of police misconduct).
21 See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 US. 465,476 (1921).
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the availability and efficiency of civil and criminal remedies against the
private interceptor should not be examined in a clean hands context
Even though civil and criminal penalties do not factor into a clean
hands analysis, they still act to deter private illegal wiretapping. Title rI
imposes a mandatory civil penalty on a private interceptor for engaging
in illegal wiretapping. 262  Additionally, Title II provides for severe
criminal penalties that allow incarceration up to five years for private
interceptors of illegal wiretapping.
26 3
Finally, equally difficult to uphold is the position that criminal
prosecutors would plea bargain with private interceptors to obtain
illicitly gathered information. Such a transaction would necessarily
deprive law enforcement officials of clean hands because they would
have knowledge that the information was illicitly obtained in violation of
Title 11. 2"
D. The Model Qualified Clean Hands Exception to the Section 2515
Exclusionary Rule Should be Applied by the Judiciary
Therefore, because of the discretionary nature of suppressing
evidence gathered in violation of Title III and the clear legislative intent
commanding that Title III's statutory exclusionary rule be applied
consistent with Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule jurisprudence, the
use of a qualified clean hands exception is appropriate to determine
whether suppression is warranted in the context of Title Mn violations.265
In determining the proper scope of a clean hands exception, courts
should consider Section 2516. Then, evidence from an illegal private
wiretap will only be admitted where law enforcement officials have
clean hands and when the information is probative of a crime
enumerated in Section 2516.26  When these conditions are complied
with, wiretap evidence gathered under a qualified clean hands exception
to Section 2515's statutory exclusionary rule should be admitted into
evidence at trial as such evidence satisfies the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.267  Additionally, adoption of a qualified clean hands
M2 See supra note 10 (pointing out the civil penalties associated with violating Title ll's
strictures).
See supra note 10 (pointing out the criminal penalties associated with violating Title III's
strictures).
See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1994).
2 See supra Part W.A.
2, See supra Part W.B.
26 See supra Part IV.C.1.
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exception to Section 2515 should not create any improper incentives to
increase illicit private wiretapping.2 6' Consequently, it is appropriate for
the judiciary to apply a qualified clean hands exception to the Section
2515 exclusionary rule to admit wiretap evidence from private wiretaps
only where law enforcement officials have clean hands and when the
wiretap is relevant to crimes enumerated by Section 2516.
V. CONCLUSION
At the time Title III of the Omnibus Safe Streets and Crime Control
Actof 1968 was established, the drafters of the Act were careful to make
sure that the wiretap regulations were consistent with the guidance
provided by the United States Supreme Court in Berger and Katz. In
drafting Title III, Congress attempted to ensure that Title Ill adequately
protected individual privacy interests in using telephones but allowed
law enforcement officials to use wiretaps in their efforts to combat crime
in a manner consistent with the Fourth Amendment. By drafting a
statutory exclusionary rule to coincide with the dual intent behind Title
I, Congress declared that Section 2515 was to be applied in a manner
that was consistent with the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule.
However, largely due to over-reliance on an unsupported judicial
assertion of legislative intent in Gelbard, a conflict between federal
circuits has developed in applying the Title III statutory exclusionary
rule. That decision extended too broadly and inappropriately
implemented the intent of Congress at the expense of both privacy and
crime control interests.
In recognizing and applying a qualified clean hands exception to
Title M's statutory exclusionary rule, the judiciary should return to the
"middle" and apply Section 2515's exclusionary rule in the manner that
was originally contemplated by Congress. It is appropriate for the
judiciary to apply a qualified clean hands exception to Section 2515's
exclusionary rule to admit wiretap evidence from private wiretaps only
where law enforcement officials have clean hands and only when the
wiretap is probative of crimes enumerated by Section 2516. Only in
applying a qualified clean hands exception to the Title El's statutory
exclusionary rule can the judiciary correctly implement the congressional
intent behind Title III. In so doing, the judiciary will appropriately
balance individual privacy interests and law enforcement officials'
efforts combat crime.
Shaun T. Olsen
20See supra Part IV.C.2.
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